

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims:

- (a) where the High Contracting Party is also a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority referred to in Article 96, para 3, of that Protocol has undertaken to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in accordance with Article 96, para 3, of the said Protocol, and undertakes to apply this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict; or
- (b) where the High Contracting Party is not a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority of the type referred to in sub-para (a) above accepts and applies the obligations of the Geneva Conventions and of this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict. Such an acceptance and application shall have in relation to that conflict the following effects:
 - (i) the Geneva Conventions and this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are brought into force for the parties to the conflict with immediate effect;
 - (ii) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols; and
 - (iii) the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are equally binding upon all parties to the conflict.

The High Contracting Party and the authority may also agree to accept and apply the obligations of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on a reciprocal basis.

Article 8 Review and amendments

1

- (a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Convention or any annexed Protocol by which it is bound. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall notify it to all the High Contracting Parties and shall see their views on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority, that shall not be less than eighteen of the High Contracting Parties so agree, he shall promptly convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties shall be invited. states not parties to this Convention shall be invited to the conference as observers.
- (b) Such a conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted and shall enter into force in the same manner as this Convention and the annexed Protocols, provided that amendments to this Convention may be adopted only by the High Contracting Parties and that amendments to a specific annexed Protocol may be adopted only by the High Contracting Parties which are bound by that Protocol.

2

- (a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose additional Protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols. Any such proposal for an additional Protocol shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall notify it to all the High Contracting Parties in accordance with sub-para 1(a) of this article. If a majority, that shall not be less than eighteen of the High Contracting Parties

so agree, the Depositary shall promptly convene a conference to which all states shall be invited.

- (b) Such a conference may agree, with the full participation of all states represented at the conference, upon additional protocols which shall be adopted in the same manner as this Convention, shall be annexed thereto and shall enter into force as provided in paras 3 and 4 of Article 5 of this Convention.

3

- (a) If, after a period of 10 years following the entry into force of this Convention, no conference has been convened in accordance with sub-para 1(a) or 2(a) of this article, any High Contracting Party may request the Depositary to convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties shall be invited to review the scope and operation of this Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of this Convention or of the existing Protocols. states not Parties to this Convention shall be invited as observers to the conference. The conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with sub-para 1(b) above.
- (b) At such conference consideration may also be given to any proposal for additional Protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols. All states represented at the conference may participate fully in such consideration. Any additional protocols shall be adopted in the same manner as this Convention, shall be annexed thereto and shall enter into force as provided in paras 3 and 4 of Article 5 of this Convention.
- (c) Such a conference may consider whether provision should be made for the convening of a further conference at the request of any High Contracting Party if, after a similar period to that referred to in sub-para 3(a) of this article, no conference has been convened in accordance with sub-para 1(a) or 2(a) of this Article.

Article 9 Denunciation

1 Any High Contracting Party may denounce this Convention or any of its annexed Protocols by so notifying the Depositary.

2 Any such denunciation shall only take effect one year after receipt by the Depositary of the notification of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of that year the denouncing High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article 1, the Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed Protocols until the end of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any case, until the termination of operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-establishment of the person protected by the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in the case of any annexed Protocol containing provisions concerning situations in which peace-keeping, observation or similar functions are performed by United Nations forces or missions in the area concerned, until the termination of those functions.

3 Any denunciation of this Convention shall be considered as also applying to all annexed Protocols by which the denouncing High Contracting Party is bound.

4 Any denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing High Contracting Party.

5 Any denunciation shall not affect the obligations already incurred, by reason of an armed conflict, under this Convention and its annexed Protocols by such denouncing High Contracting Party in respect of any act committed before this denunciation becomes effective.

Article 10 Depositary

1 The Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Convention and of its annexed Protocols.

2 In addition to his usual functions, the Depositary shall inform all states of:

- (a) signatures affixed to this Convention under Article 3;
- (b) deposits of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention deposited under Article 4;
- (c) notifications of consent to be bound by annexed Protocols under Article 4;
- (d) the dates of entry into force of this Convention and of each of its annexed Protocols under Article 5; and
- (e) notifications of denunciation received under Article 9, and their effective date.

Article 11 Authentic texts

The original of this Convention with the annexed Protocols, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary, who shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all states.

PROTOCOL ON NON-DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS (PROTOCOL I)

It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.

PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES, BOOBY- TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES (PROTOCOL II)

Article 1 Material scope of application

This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.

Article 2 Definitions

For the purpose of this Protocol:

1 'Mine' means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and 'remotely delivered mine' means any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from an aircraft.

2 'Booby-trap' means any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

3 'Other devices' means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.

4 'Military objective' means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

5 'Civilian objects' are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in para 4.

6 'Recording' means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps.

Article 3 General restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices

1 This article applies to:

- (a) mines;
- (b) booby-traps; and
- (c) other devices.

2 It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians.

3 The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:

- (a) which is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or
- (b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
- (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

4 All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.

Article 4 Restrictions on the use of mines other than remotely delivered mines, booby-traps and other devices in populated areas

1 This article applies to:

- (a) mines other than remotely delivered mines;
- (b) booby-traps; and
- (c) other devices.

2 It is prohibited to use weapons to which this article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either:

- (a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of an adverse party; or

- (b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the provision of fences.

Article 5 Restrictions on the use of remotely delivered mines

1 The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives, and unless:

- (a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article 7(1)(a); or
- (b) an effective neutralising mechanism is used on each such mine, that is to say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to render a mine harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine will no longer serve the military purpose for which it was placed in position, or a remotely-controlled mechanism which is designed to render harmless or destroy a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.

2 Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

Article 6 Prohibition on the use of certain booby-traps

1 Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use:

- (a) any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to detonate when it is disturbed or approached; or
- (b) booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated with:
 - (i) internationally recognised protective emblems, signs or signals;
 - (ii) sick, wounded or dead persons;
 - (iii) burial or cremation sites or graves;
 - (iv) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation;
 - (v) children's toys or other portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children;
 - (vi) food or drink;
 - (vii) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or military supply depots;
 - (viii) objects clearly of a religious nature;
 - (ix) historic monuments, works of art or places or worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
 - (x) animals or their carcasses.

2 It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap which is designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

Article 7 Recording and publication of the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps

1 The parties to a conflict shall record the location of:

- (a) all pre-planned minefields laid by them; and
- (b) all areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use of booby-traps.

2 The parties shall endeavour to ensure the recording of the location of all other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or placed in position.

3 All such records shall be retained by the parties who shall:

- (a) immediately after the cessation of active hostilities:
 - (i) take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such records, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps; and either
 - (ii) in cases where the forces of neither party are in the territory of the adverse party, make available to each other and to the Secretary General of the United Nations all information in their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in the territory of the adverse party; or
 - (iii) once complete withdrawal of the forces of the parties from the territory of the adverse party has taken place, make available to the adverse party and to the Secretary General of the United Nations all information in their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in the territory of the adverse party;
- (b) when a United Nations force or mission performs functions in any area, make available to the authority mentioned in Article 8 such information as is required by that article;
- (c) whenever possible, by mutual agreement provide for the release of information concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps, particularly in agreements governing the cessation of hostilities.

Article 8 Protection of United Nations forces and missions from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps

1 When a United Nations force or mission performs functions of peacekeeping, observation or similar functions in any area, each party to the conflict shall if requested by the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, as far as it is able:

- (a) remove or render harmless all mines or booby-traps in that area;
- (b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect the force or mission from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps while carrying out its duties; and
- (c) make available to the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, all information in the party's possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in that area.

2 When a United Nations fact-finding mission performs functions in any area, any party to the conflict concerned shall provide protection to that mission except where, because of the size of such mission, it cannot adequately provide such protection. In that case it shall make available to the head of the mission the information in its possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in that area.

Article 9 International co-operation in the removal of minefields, mines and booby-traps

After the cessation of active hostilities, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other states and with international organisations, on the provision of information and technical and material assistance – including, in appropriate circumstances, joint operations necessary to remove or otherwise render ineffective minefields, mines and booby-traps placed in position during the conflict.

TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES (PROTOCOL II)

Whenever an obligation for the recording of the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps arises under the Protocol, the following guidelines shall be taken into account.

- 1 With regard to pre-planned minefields and large-scale and pre-planned use of booby-traps:
 - (a) maps, diagrams or other records should be made in such a way as to indicate the extent of the minefield or booby-trapped area; and
 - (b) the location of the minefield or booby-trapped area should be specified by relation to the co-ordinates of a single reference point and by the estimated dimensions of the area containing mines and booby-traps in relation to that single reference point.
- 2 With regard to other minefields, mines and booby-traps laid or placed in position:

In so far as possible, the relevant information specified in para 1 above should be recorded so as to enable the areas containing minefields, mines and booby-traps to be identified.

PROTOCOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF INCENDIARY WEAPONS (PROTOCOL III)

Article 1 Definitions

For the purpose of this Protocol:

- 1 'Incendiary weapon' means any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
 - (a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances.
 - (b) Incendiary weapons do not include:
 - (i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems;
 - (ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.
- 2 'Concentration of civilians' means any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads.

3 'Military objective' means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

4 'Civilian objects' are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in para 3.

5 'Feasible precautions' are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.

Article 2 Protection of civilians and civilian objects

1 It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.

2 It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.

3 It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

4 It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives.

15.5.1.2 Weapons of mass destruction

One of the first decisions taken by the UN General Assembly was made in January 1946 to establish a Commission for, *inter alia*, the 'elimination of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction'. The Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, as well as certain lethal chemical and biological weapons. The General Assembly later expanded the definition to include any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb.

The main type of weapons of mass destruction are nuclear weapons and the international law on the subject operates on two levels. First, there are restrictions on the production and possession of nuclear weapons, for example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1963 which restricts the number of states which can build and possess nuclear weapons.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1968)²

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

The states concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty',

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon states from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other states to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all states in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

2 UNTS No 10485, Vol 729, pp 169–75.

territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1 Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2 Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3 The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4 Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other states in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such

agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1 Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2 All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other states or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon states. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1 Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2 Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States