

THE  
OXFORD  
HANDBOOKS  
OF  
POLITICAL  
SCIENCE

GENERAL EDITOR  
ROBERT E. GOODIN

EDITED BY  
MICHAEL  
MORAN  
MARTIN  
REIN  
ROBERT E.  
GOODIN

≡ The Oxford Handbook of  
**PUBLIC POLICY**

rights and wrongs of banning smoking in public places had been hotly contested for years; but once the risks of “passive smoking” became known, it ceased being a matter of moral dispute and became a straightforward issue of preventing public assaults (Goodin 1989).

Issues cease being issues for all sorts of reasons: some good, some bad. “Benign neglect” might have been the best way of treating all sorts of issues, ranging from race to abortion (Luker 1984). Making public policy can often be a mistake. But making an issue of child abuse and neglect was almost certainly not a mistake (Nelson 1984). The difference between those cases is that in the former there was a real risk of countermobilization undoing any good done by making *de facto* policies more public, whereas in the latter there seems little risk of countermobilization by or even on behalf of child abusers.

Thinking about the way issues become, or fail to become, policy “problems” takes us right back to the heart of the argument about the persuasive vocation of policy studies. We have argued that the grounds for this persuasive conception are formidable. They include the limits of instrumental rationality; the importance of deliberation in policy formation; the overwhelming evidence of the way modern governing conditions demand a style of policy making that maximizes consultation and voluntary coordination.

“High modernism” is an anachronism. Running modern government by its dictates is like trying to assemble motor cars on a replica of one of Ford’s 1920s assembly lines—a recipe for defective production, when interacting components are not fully decomposable (Simon 1981).

But the pursuit of this persuasive vocation is a hard road to follow. It demands a unique combination of skills: the skills of “normal” social science allied to the skills of “rhetoric” in the best sense of that much misused word. And the persuasive vocation must be practised in a hostile world. There is hostility from pressed decision makers who feel impelled to make rapid decisions in the face of urgency or even crisis; hostility from the still powerful administrative doctrines associated with the high modernist project; and hostility from entrenched powers and interests threatened by more reflective and inclusive modes of decision. Intellectually anachronistic doctrines continue to flourish in the world of policy practice for a whole range of reasons, and all are applicable to the case of high modernism. Within bureaucracies and in the vastly rewarding consulting industries that have grown up around the New Public Management there is a huge investment—intellectual and financial—in the modernistic drive for measurement and hierarchical control (Power 1997). Individual crazes still sweep across policy worlds because they offer possibilities of evading democratic control: the enthusiasm for evidence-based policy making in arenas like health care is a case in point (Harrison, Moran, and Wood 2002). And in the promotion of one key variant of high modernism—globalization—key global management institutions like the World Bank and the IMF continue to promote standardized reform packages (Rodrik 1997; Stiglitz 2002; Cammack 2002).

So, in the end, the persuasive appeal comes back to power and interests. Which is to say, politics. Just as the founders of the policy sciences told us from the start.

Policy analysts use the imperfect tools of their trade not only to assist legitimately elected officials in implementing their democratic mandates, but also to empower some groups rather than others. Furthermore, policy is never permanent, made once and for all time. Puzzles get transformed into actionable problems, and policies get made on that basis. But that gives rise to further puzzlement, and the quest for ways of acting on those new problems. The persuasive task of policy making and analysis alike lodges in these dynamics of deciding which puzzle to solve, what counts as a solution, and whose interests to serve.

## REFERENCES

- AARON, H. J., and REISCHAUER, R. D. (eds.) 1999. *Setting National Priorities*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- ACKERMAN, B. A., and FISHKIN, J. S. 2004. *Deliberation Day*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- ALLISON, G. T., and ZELIKOW, P. 1999. *The Essence of Decision*, 2nd edn. Reading, Mass.: Longman.
- AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (ASPA) 1984. *Code of Ethics*. Washington, DC: ASPA.
- ANTON, T. J. 1980. *Administered Politics: Elite Political Culture in Sweden*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
- ARROW, K. J. 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. *Review of Economic Studies*, 29: 155–73.
- and HAHN, F. 1971. *General Competitive Analysis*. San Francisco: Holden Day.
- ATIYAH, P. S. 1979. *The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- ATKINSON, A. B. 1996. The case for a participation income. *Political Quarterly*, 67: 67–70.
- CANTILLON, B., MARLIER, E., and NOLAN, B. 2002. *Social Indicators: The EU and Social Inclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BARDACH, E. 1977. *The Implementation Game: What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
1980. On designing implementable programs. In Majone and Quade 1980, 138–58.
- BECK, U. 1992. *The Risk Society*, trans. M. Ritter. London: Sage.
- BENTHAM, J. 1843/1787. Panopticon: or, the Inspection House: Containing the idea of a new principle of construction applicable to penitentiary houses, prisons, houses of industry, work houses, poor houses, manufactories, mad houses, hospitals, and schools; with a plan of management adapted to the principle. In *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. J. Bowring, vol. iv. Edinburgh: William Tait.
- BERRY, J. M. 1977. *Lobbying for the People*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- BETTS, R. K. 1978. Analysis, war & decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable. *World Politics*, 31: 61–89.
- BLAU, P. M. 1963. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- BLAUG, M. 1963. The myth of the old poor law and the making of the new. *Journal of Economic History*, 23: 151–84.
- BOVENS, M. A. P. 1990. The social steering of complex organizations. *British Journal of Political Science*, 20: 91–117.
1998. *The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- and 'T HART, P. 1996. *Understanding Policy Fiascos*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- BRAITHWAITE, J., and DRAHOS, P. 2000. *Global Business Regulation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MAKKAI, T., BRAITHWAITE, V., and GIBSON, D. 1993. *Raising the Standard*, Final Report of the Nursing Home Regulation in Action Project to the Department of Health, Housing and Community Services. Canberra: AGPS.
- CAIN, B., DALTON, R., and SCARROW, S. (eds.) 2003. *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CALVERT, R., MCCUBBINS, M. D., and WEINGAST, B. R. 1989. A theory of political control and agency discretion. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33: 588–61.
- CAMMACK, P. 2002. The mother of all governments: the World Bank's matrix for global governance. Pp. 36–53 in *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*, ed. R. Wilkinson and S. Hughes. London: Routledge.
- CASTELLS, M. 2000. Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society. *British Journal of Sociology*, 51 (1): 5–24.
- CASTLES, F. G. 1985. *The Working Class and the Welfare State: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand, 1890–1980*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
2001. A farewell to Australia's welfare state. *International Journal of Health Services*, 31 (3): 537–44.
- COASE, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. *Economica*, 4: 386–405.
1974. The market for goods and the market for ideas. *American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings)*, 64 (2): 384–402.
- COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 2001. *Building Better Partnerships*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- COURPASSON, D. 2000. Managerial strategies of domination: power in soft bureaucracies. *Organization Studies*, 21: 141–61.
- CRENSON, M. A. 1998. *Building the Invisible Orphanage: A Prehistory of the American Welfare System*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- CROZIER, M., HUNTINGTON, S., and WATANUKI, J. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy*. New York: New York University Press.
- DAHL, R. A. 1985. *A Preface to Economic Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- DAY, P., and KLEIN, R. 1987. *Accountabilities: Five Public Services*. London: Tavistock.
- DEAR, M. J., and WOLCH, J. R. 1987. *Landscapes of Despair: From Deinstitutionalization to Homelessness*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- DERTHICK, M. 1975. *Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- DEUTSCH, K. 1963. *The Nerves of Government*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- DICEY, A. V. 1960/1885. *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, 10th edn. London: Macmillan.
- DOWNES, A. 1972. Up and down with ecology: the issue attention cycle. *Public Interest*, 28: 38–50.
- DRYZEK, J. S. 2000. *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DUNLEAVY, P. 1981. *The Politics of Mass Housing 1945–75*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1995. Policy disasters: explaining the UK's record. *Public Policy and Administration*, 10: 52–70.
- DYSON, K. 1980. *The State Tradition in Western Europe*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- and WILKS, S. (eds.) 1983. *Industrial Crisis: A Comparative Study of the State and Industry*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- ESPING ANDERSEN, G. 1985. *Politics against Markets*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- ETZIONI, A. 1965. *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*. New York: Free Press.

- FISCHER, F. 2003. *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- and FORESTER, J. (eds.) 1993. *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- FRIED, C. 2004. *Saying What the Law Is*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- FUNG, A. 2004. *Empowering Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- and WRIGHT, E. O. 2001. Deepening democracy: innovations in empowered participatory governance. *Politics & Society*, 29 (1): 5–41.
- GALANTER, M. 1974. Why the “haves” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change. *Law & Society Review*, 9: 95–160.
- GIBSON, D. M., and GOODIN, R. E. 1999. The veil of vagueness. Pp. 357–85 in *Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen*, ed. M. Egeberg and P. Lægreid. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- GOODIN, R. E. 1982. *Political Theory & Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1989. *No Smoking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2001. Something for nothing? Pp. 90–8 in P. Van Parijs et al. *What’s Wrong With a Free Lunch?*, ed. J. Cohen and J. Rogers. Boston: Beacon.
2003. Democratic accountability: the distinctiveness of the Third Sector. *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 44: 359–96.
- GOODSELL, C. T. 1992. The public administrator as artisan. *Public Administration Review*, 52: 246–53.
- GORE, A. 1993. *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less*, Report of the National Performance Review. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- GRANT, W. 1997. *The Common Agricultural Policy*. New York: St Martin’s.
- GREENSTEIN, F. I. 1982. *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*. New York: Basic Books.
- HAJER, M. A. 1995. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2003. Policy without polity? Policy analysis and the institutional void. *Policy Sciences*, 36: 175–95.
- and WAGENAAR, H. (eds.) 2003. *Deliberative Policy Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HALBERSTAM, D. 1969. *The Best and the Brightest*. New York: Random House.
- HALL, P. (ed.) 1989. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- HARRISON, S., MORAN, M., and WOOD, B. 2002. Policy emergence and policy convergence: the case of ‘scientific bureaucratic’ medicine in the United States and the United Kingdom. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4(1): 1–24.
- HART, H. L. A. 1961. *The Concept of Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- HAVEMAN, R. H., and MARGOLIS, J. (eds.) 1983. *Public Expenditure & Policy Analysis*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- HECLO, H. 1978. Issue networks and the executive establishment. Pp. 87–124 in *The New American Political System*, ed. A. King. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- and WILDAVSKY, A. 1974. *The Private Government of Public Money*. London: Macmillan.
- HENDERSON, P. D. 1977. Two British errors: their probable size and some possible lessons. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 29: 159–205.
- HÉRITIER, A. 1999. *Public Policy Making and Diversity in Europe: Escaping Deadlock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HIRSCH, F. 1976. *Social Limits to Growth*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- HIRSCHMAN, A. O. 1982. *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- HITCH, C. J. 1958. Economics and military operations research. *Review of Economics & Statistics*, 40: 119–209.
- and McKEAN, R. N. 1960. *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- HOFSTADTER, R. 1948. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*. New York: Knopf.
- HOGWOOD, B., and PETERS., B. G. 1985. *The Pathology of Public Policy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- HOOD, C. 1976. *The Limits of Administration*. London: Wiley.
1983. *The Tools of Government*. London: Macmillan.
- KATZ, R., and MAIR, P. 1995. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. *Party Politics*, 1: 5–28.
- KAUFMANN, F. X., MAJONE, G., and OSTROM, V. (eds.) 1985. *Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- KECK, M., and SIKKINK, K. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- KING, A. 1975. Overload. *Political Studies*, 23: 284–96.
- KINGDON, J. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- KLEIN, R. 2001. *The New Politics of the NHS*, 4th edn. Harlow: Prentice Hall.
- KNEESE, A. V., and SCHULTZE, C. L. 1975. *Pollution, Prices and Public Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- KORNAI, J., MASKIN, E., and ROLAND, G. 2003. Understanding the soft budget constraint. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41 (4: Dec.): 1095–136.
- LA PORTE, T. R. (ed.) 1975. *Organized Social Complexity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- LASSWELL, H. D. 1941. The garrison state. *American Journal of Sociology*, 46: 455–68.
1950. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* New York: P. Smith.
1951. The policy orientation. In Lerner and Lasswell 1951, 3–15.
- LE GRAND, J. 1991. Quasi markets and social policy. *Economic Journal*, 101: 1256–67.
- LERNER, D., and LASSWELL, H. D. (eds.) 1951. *The Policy Sciences*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- LEVI, M. 1988. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- LEVI FAUR, D. 2003. The politics of liberalization: privatization and regulation for competition in Europe's and Latin America's telecoms and electric industries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (5): 705–40.
- LEVINE, H. D. 1977. Some things to all men: the politics of cruise missile development. *Public Policy*, 25: 117–68.
- LIJPHART, A. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- LINDBLOM, C. E. 1965. *The Intelligence of Democracy*. New York: Free Press.
1977. *Politics and Markets*. New York: Basic Books.
1979. Still muddling: not yet through. *Public Administration Review*, 39: 517–26.
- LIPSKY, M. 1980. *Street Level Bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage.
- LOCKE, J. 1690. *Second Treatise of Government*, ed. P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
- LUKER, K. 1984. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- LYNN, N. B., and WILDAVSKY, A. (eds.) 1990. *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

- MACDONAGH, O. 1958. The nineteenth century revolution in government: a reappraisal. *Historical Journal*, 1: 52–67.
1961. *A Pattern of Government Growth, 1800–1860*. London: MacGibbon and Kee.
- McFARLAND, A. S. 1976. *Public Interest Lobbies*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- MACKENZIE, W. J. M. 1963. The Plowden Report: a translation. *Guardian*, 25 May. Reprinted pp. 238–51 in Mackenzie, *Explorations in Government*. London: Macmillan, 1975.
- MAJONE, G. 1989. *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
1994. Paradoxes of privatization and deregulation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1 (1: June): 53–69.
- and QUADE, E. S. (eds.) 1980. *Pitfalls of Analysis*. Chichester: Wiley, for International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
- MANSBRIDGE, J. J. 1986. *Why We Lost the ERA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- MARCH, J. G. 1972. Model bias in social action. *Review of Educational Research*, 42: 413–29.
1976. The technology of foolishness. In March and Olsen 1976, 69–81.
- and OLSEN, J. P. 1976. *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- SPOUL, L. S., and TAMUZ, M. 1991. Learning from samples of one or fewer. *Organization Science*, 2: 1–13.
- MARMOR, T. R. 1994. *Understanding Health Care Reform*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- and THOMAS, D. 1972. Doctors, politics and pay disputes: “Pressure Group Politics” revisited. *British Journal of Political Science*, 2: 421–42.
- MARRIS, P., and REIN, M. 1982. *Dilemmas of Social Reform*, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. First pub. 1967.
- MARSHALL, G. 1984. *Constitutional Conventions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- MEADE, J. E. 1970. *The Theory of Indicative Planning*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MECHANIC, D., and ROCHEFORT, D. A. 1990. Deinstitutionalization: an appraisal of reform. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 16: 301–27.
- MEIJER, H. 1969. Bureaucracy and policy formulation in Sweden. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 4: 102–16.
- MERTON, R. K. 1936. The unintended consequences of purposive social action. *American Sociological Review*, 1: 894–904.
- MILLS, C. W. 1959. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- MORAN, M. 2003. *The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper Innovation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MOYNIHAN, D. P. 1973. *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan*. New York: Random House.
- MURRAY, C. 1984. *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–80*. New York: Basic.
- MYRDAL, G. 1944. *An American Dilemma*. New York: Harper and Row.
1955. *Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter Governmental Organizations*. L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture, No. 24; delivered at Bedford College, London, 25 Feb. 1954. London: Oxford University Press.
- NELSON, B. J. 1984. *Making an Issue of Child Abuse: Political Agenda Setting for Social Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- NEUSTADT, R. E. 1960. *Presidential Power*. New York: Wiley.
- and MAY, E. R. 1986. *Thinking in Time*. New York: Free Press.

- NEWMAN, O. 1972. *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design*. New York: Macmillan.
- NORTH, D. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OFFE, C. 1984. *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
2003. The European model of “social” capitalism: can it survive European integration? *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12: 437–69.
- OLSEN, J. P. 1972a. Public policy making and theories of organizational choice. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 7: 45–62.  
1972b. Voting, “sounding out” and the governance of modern organisations. *Acta Sociologica*, 15: 267–84.
- OSBORNE, D., and GAEBLER, T. 1993. *Reinventing Government*. New York: Plume/Penguin.
- PAGE, B. I. 1983. *Who Gets What from Government?* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- PETERS, B. G., and PIERRE, J. (eds.) 2003. *Handbook of Public Administration*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.  
2004. *Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective: The Quest for Control*. London: Routledge.
- PIERSON, P. 1994. *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
2000. Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94 (2: June): 251–68.
- PIVEN, F. F., and CLOWARD, R. A. 1979. *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books.
- POWER, M. 1997. *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- PRESSMAN, J. L., and WILDAVSKY, A. 1973. *Implementation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- PUTNAM, R. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- RAND CORPORATION 2004. History and mission. Available at: [www.rand.org/about/history](http://www.rand.org/about/history) (accessed 10 July 2004).
- REHBINDER, E., and STEWART, R. 1985. *Environmental Protection Policy*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- REICH, R. B. (ed.) 1988. *The Power of Public Ideas*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
- REIN, M. 1976. *Social Science and Public Policy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- RHODES, R. A. W. 1988. *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*. London: Unwin Hyman.  
1997. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- RISSE, T., ROPP, S. C., and SIKKINK, K. (eds.) 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- RIVLIN, A. M. 1971. *Systematic Thinking for Social Action*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- RODRIK, D. 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, DC: Institution of International Economics.
- ROSE ACKERMAN, S. 1992. *Rethinking the Progressive Agenda*. New York: Free Press.  
1996. Altruism, nonprofits and economic theory. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34: 701–28.
- SABATIER, P. A., and JENKINS SMITH, H. C. (eds.) 1993. *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.



- SACKS, J. 1995. Shock therapy in Poland: perspectives of 5 years. *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, 16: 265–90.
- SAGAN, C. 1983. Nuclear war and climate consequence: some policy implications. *Foreign Affairs*, 62: 257–92.
- and TURCO, R. 1990. *A Path Where No Man Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race*. New York: Random House.
- SALAMON, L. (ed.) 2002. *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SALTMAN, R., and VON OTTER, C. 1992. *Planned Markets and Public Competition: Strategic Reform in Northern European Health Systems*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- SCHARPF, F. W. 1988. The joint decision trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration. *Public Administration*, 66: 239–78.
- SCHMIDTZ, D., and GOODIN, R. E. 1998. *Social Welfare & Individual Responsibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SCHÖN, D. A., and REIN, M. 1994. *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. New York: Basic.
- SCHULTZE, C. L. 1977. *The Public Use of Private Interest*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- SCHUMPETER, J. A. 1950. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd edn. New York: Harper and Row.
- SCOTT, J. C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
1997. *Seeing Like a State*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- SELF, P. 1975. *Econocrats and the Policy Process: The Politics and Philosophy of Cost Benefit Analysis*. London: Macmillan.
1993. *Government by the Market?* London: Macmillan.
- and STORING, H. 1962. *The State and the Farmer*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- SHAPIRO, I. 1999. Enough of deliberation: politics is about interests and power. Pp. 28–38 in *Deliberative Politics*, ed. S. Macedo. New York: Oxford University Press.
- SIMON, H. A. 1951. A formal theory of the employment relationship. *Econometrica*, 19: 293–305.
1955. A behavioral theory of rational choice. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69: 99–118.
1981. *The Sciences of the Artificial*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
2000. Public administration in today's world of organizations & markets. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 33 (4: Dec.): 749–56.
- SKOCPOL, T. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- SMITH, M. 1990. *The Politics of Agricultural Support in Britain: Development of the Agricultural Policy Community*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- SMITH, S. R., and LIPSKY, M. 1993. *Non Profits for Hire: The Welfare State in an Age of Contracting*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- STEINER, J., BÄCHTIGER, A. B., SPÖRNDLI, M., and STEENBERGEN, M. R. 2005. *Deliberative Politics in Action: Cross national Study of Parliamentary Debates*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- STIGLITZ, J. E. 2002. *Globalization and its Discontents*. London: Penguin.
- STOKEY, E., and ZECKHAUSER, R. 1978. *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. New York: Norton.
- SUNSTEIN, C. R. 1993. *Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech*. New York: Free Press.
2001. *Republic.com*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- TARROW, S. G. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- TILLY, C. 1999. Power – top down and bottom up. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 7: 330–52.

- UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (UCS) 2004. *Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into the Bush Administration's Misuse of Science*. Available at: [www.ucsusa.org/global\\_environment/rsi/page.cfm?pageID=1322](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/rsi/page.cfm?pageID=1322) (accessed 10 July 2004).
- US COMPTROLLER GENERAL 1979. *Higher Penalties Could Deter Violations of Nuclear Regulations*. Report to the Congress EMD 79 9. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office.
- VAN EVERA, S. 2003. Why states believe foolish ideas: non self evaluation by states and societies. Ch. 19 in *Perspectives on Structural Realism*, ed. A. K. Hanami. New York: Palgrave.
- VAN GUNSTEREN, H. 1976. *The Quest for Control*. London: Wiley.
- VICKERS, G. 1983. *The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy Making*. London: Harper and Row.
- WALKER, J. L. 1969. The diffusion of innovations among the American states. *American Political Science Review*, 63: 880 99.
1977. Setting the agenda in the U. S. Senate: a theory of problem selection. *British Journal of Political Science*, 7: 423 46.
- WIKLER, D. 1987. Personal responsibility for illness. Pp. 326 58 in *Health Care Ethics*, ed. D. van de Veer and T. Regan. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- WILDAVSKY, A. 1973. If planning is everything, maybe it's nothing. *Policy Sciences*, 4: 127 53.
1979. *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- WILLIAMSON, O. E. 1985. *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting*. New York: Free Press.
- WILSON, J. Q., and KELLING, G. L. 1982. Broken windows. *Atlantic Monthly*, 249 (3): 29 38.
- WILSON, W. 1887. The study of administration. *Political Science Quarterly*, 2 (2: June): 197 222.
- WILSON, W. J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- WORLD BANK 1994. *Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth*. New York: Oxford University Press
1996. *World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.
1997. *The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- YOUNG, I. M. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ZOLBERG, A. 1972. Moments of madness. *Politics & Society*, 2: 183 208.



P A R T II

---

INSTITUTIONAL  
AND HISTORICAL  
BACKGROUND

---