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Edited by

Mary Hawkesworth

and

Maurice Kogan

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are always mediated by the individuals on whom they act; environments cannot shape behaviour directly, and much politically important action is not reactive to immediate stimuli. Indeed, the capacity to be *proactive* (Murray 1968) and transcend existing perceptions of what the environment dictates is at the core of effective leadership. But the debate about whether environments determine political behaviour is a reminder of the endless interplay of individuals and the political contexts in which they find or place themselves.

Some contexts are indeed associated with the kind of behaviour that leads social determinists to be sceptical about the need to study personality. Informed of the impending collapse of a building, everyone–irrespective of temperament and personality type–will seek to leave it. Other contexts illustrate Gordon Allport's aphorism that 'the same heat that hardens the egg, melts the butter' (Allport 1937:325). Still others are virtual ink blots, leading individuals with varying characteristics to project their inner dispositions onto them.

The connection between personality and context is so integral that this relationship has become the basis of an important approach to personality theory known as interactionism (Magnusson and Endler 1977; Pervin and Lewis 1978; Endler 1981). By systematically analysing personality and politics in interactional terms, the analyst is sensitized to the kinds of contingent relationships that make the links between personality and politics elusive.

A good example of a contingent relationship in which the impact of personality is mediated by the environment is to be found in the work of Katz and Benjamin (1960) on the effects of authoritarianism in biracial work groups in the north and the south of the USA. Katz and Benjamin compared white undergraduates in the two regions who scored low and high on one of the various authoritarian personality measures to see how they comported themselves in interracial problem-solving groups. They found that in the south authoritarianism (which previous studies showed to be associated with racial prejudice) was associated with attempts of white students to dominate their black counterparts, but that in the north the authoritarians were more likely than the non-authoritarians to be *deferential* to blacks. The investigators' conclusion was that the socio-political environment of the southern authoritarians enabled them to give direct vent to their impulses, but that the liberal environment of the northern university led students with similar proclivities to go out of their way to avoid conflict with the prevailing norms.

The relative effect of environment and personality on political behaviour varies. Ambiguous environments–for example, new situations and political roles that are only sketchily defined by formal rules (Budner 1962; Greenstein 1969:50–7)–provide great latitude for actors' personalities to shape their behaviour. Structured environments–for example, bureaucratized settings and contexts in which there are well-developed and widely known and accepted norms–tend to constrain behaviour. The environment also is likely to account

for much of the variance in political behaviour when strong sanctions are attached to certain possible courses of action.

The dramatic reduction of political repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s led to an outpouring of political action. Just as the absence of authoritarian rule leads individuals in the aggregate to express their personal political proclivities, its presence magnifies the effects of leaders, assuming that the authoritarian system is one in which the individual or individuals at the top have more or less absolute power (Tucker 1965). The striking capacity of leaders' personalities to shape events in an authoritarian system was evident in the leeway Gorbachev appears to have had at the time of the initiation of *glasnost* and *perestroika,* if not later when the forces of pluralism began to bedevil him.

Just as environments vary in the extent to which they foster the expression of individual variability, so also do predispositions themselves. There is an extensive literature on the tendency of people to subordinate themselves to groups and consciously or unconsciously suppress their own views when they are in the company of others. Some individuals, however, are remarkably resistant to such inhibitions while others have compliant tendencies (Asch 1956; Allen 1975; Janis 1982). The intensity of psychological predispositions promotes their expression. Most people suppress their impulses to challenge the regimes of authoritarian systems, but those with passionate convictions and strong character-based needs for self-expression or rebellion are more likely to oppose such regimes. (In doing so, they alter the environment, providing social support for their more compliant peers to join them.)

PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL AND OTHER POLITICAL MOTIVATION

One of the ways in which humans vary is in the extent to which they manifest emotional disturbance and ego defensiveness. Equating all of personality with the psychological stratum that traditionally concerns clinical psychologists, some students of politics voice the third of the reservations about the study of personality and politics, arguing that the links between psychopathology and politics are rare and unimportant. A specific exploration of the general question of whether ego-defence motivation is common in politics can be found in the extensive empirical literature on the student political protest movements of the 1960s. Some research findings appeared to indicate that protest was rooted in 'healthy' character traits, such as an inner strength to stand by one's convictions and the cognitive capacity to cut through propaganda, whereas other reports suggested the possible influence of the kinds of neurotic needs that might, for example, arise from repressed resentment of parents or other authority figures from everyday life.

Figure 2   Predispositions of the politcal actor

In order to consider the general issue of the role of psychopathology in politics and the specific issue of the roots of protest, it is necessary to elaborate the E→P→R formula. Figure 2 expands the personality panel in Figure 1. The panel is constructed so as to suggest, in a metaphor common in personality theory (Hall and Lindzey 1970), 'levels' of psychic functioning. The level closest to the surface and most directly 'in touch' with the environment is the perceptual. Perceptions can be thought of as a cognitive screen that shapes and structures environmental stimuli, sometimes distorting them, sometimes reflecting them with considerable verisimilitude. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a burgeoning of inquiry into political perception and cognitive psychology more generally (Lau and Sears 1986; Jervis 1976; Jervis *et al.* 1985; Vertzberger 1990). Also at the surface, in the sense that they are conscious or accessible to consciousness, are political orientations such as attitudes, beliefs and convictions. Psychologists commonly conceive of

dispositions at this level as composites of the more basic processes of cognition (thought), affect (emotion) and conation (proclivities toward action).

The sub-panel of Figure 2 labelled 'functional bases of conscious orientations' and, more or less synonymously, 'basic personality structures', represents the level of psychic activity that political scientists often have in mind when they speak of personality. Different personality theorists emphasize the importance of different underlying personality structures, but most of them distinguish (in varied terminology) three broad classes of inner processes—those bearing on thought and perception, on emotions and their management (including feelings of which the individual may have little conscious understanding) and on the relation of the self to significant others. The terms used for these processes in Figure 2 are cognition, ego defence and mediation of self-other relations. Figure 2 also includes a sub-panel identifying the genetic and acquired physical states that contribute to personality and diffuse into political behaviour (Masters 1989; Park 1986).

Both the broad question of whether psychopathology manifests itself in political behaviour and the narrow question of what motivates political rebels can be illuminated by reference to Figure 2. One way of thinking about political attitudes and behaviour is in terms of the functions they serve for the personality (Smith *et al.* 1956; Pratkanis *et al.* 1989)—hence the use of the phrase 'functional bases of conscious orientations'. What might on the surface seem to be the same belief or class of action, may serve different functions in the motivational economies of different people. For one individual a certain view—for example, a positive or negative racial stereotype—may result from the available information in the environment, mainly serving needs for cognitive closure. For another, it might be rooted in a need to take cues from (or be different from) significant others. For a third, it might serve the ego-defensive function of venting unacknowledged aggressive impulses. (More often than not, a political behaviour is likely to be fuelled by more than one motivation, but with varying mixes from individual to individual.)

The incidence of psychopathological and other motivational bases of political orientations needs to be established by empirical inquiry. Just as some environmental contexts leave room for the play of personality in general, some are especially conducive to the expression of ego defences. These include stimuli that appeal to the powerful emotional impulses that people are socialized to deny, but that remain potent beneath the surface. For example, there is an especially steamy quality to political contention over issues like abortion and pornography that bear on sexuality. Nationalistic issues such as flag burning and matters of religious doctrine also channel political passions (Davies 1980), for reasons that have not been adequately explained. Extreme forms of behaviour are also likely (though not certain) to have a pathological basis, as in the behaviour of

American presidential assassins such as Ronald Reagan's would-be killer, John Hinckley, Jr (Clarke 1990).

The circumstances under which psychopathology and its lesser variants find their way into politics are of great interest, as are those under which the other motivational bases of political behaviour come into play. Depending upon the basic personality systems to which a given aspect of political performance is linked, differences can be expected in the conditions under which it will be aroused and changed, as well as in the detailed way it will manifest itself. Opinions and actions based in cognitive needs will be responsive to new information. Those based on social needs will respond to changes in the behaviour and signals provided by significant others. Those based on ego defences may be intractable, or only subject to change by extensive efforts to bring about self-insight, or by certain manipulative strategies such as suggestion by authority figures (Katz 1960).

The functional approach to the study of political orientations provides a useful framework for determining whether and under what circumstances political protest has motivational sources in ego-defensive needs. There is much evidence bearing on this issue, at least as it applies to student protest. A remarkable number of empirical studies were done of student protest activity of the late 1960s and early 1970s in the United States and elsewhere, no doubt because that activity occurred in contexts where numerous social scientists were available to conduct research. A huge literature ensued, abounding in seemingly contradictory findings, many of which, however, appear to fit into a quite plausible larger pattern, once one takes account of the diversity of the institutions in which protest was studied and of the particular periods in the cycle of late 1960s and early 1970s student protest in which the various studies were conducted.

The earliest student protests of the 1960s occurred in colleges and universities with meritocratic admissions policies and upper middle-class student bodies. The first studies of this period, those by Flacks (1967) of University of Chicago students, suggested that student protest was largely a cognitive manifestation—the response of able students to the perceived iniquities of their political environment. Later analyses of data collected in the same period on similar populations (students at the University of California, Berkeley) suggested a more complex pattern in which some of the activists did seem to have the cognitive strengths and preoccupations that Flacks had argued were the mark of *all* of them, but others appeared to be channeling ego-defensive needs (based in troubled parent-child relations) into their protest behaviour. The students who the later analysts concluded had ego-defensive motivations and those who they concluded were acting out of cognitive needs showed different patterns of protest behaviour, the first directing their activity

only on the issues of national and international politics, the second taking part in local reform activities (Block *et al.* 1969).

The psychological correlates of student activism changed over time in the United States, as activism developed from the actions of a few students in the 'elite' universities to a widespread form of behaviour, which at the time of the Nixon administration's incursion into Cambodia and the killing of student protesters at Kent State University manifested itself in the bulk of American college and university campuses. Studies conducted at that time found little in the way of variation in the characteristics of protesters (Dunlap 1970; Peterson and Bilorusky 1971).

PERSONALITY, HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Variation according to historical context and change over time are so important in determining how personality becomes linked with politics that the map around which this article is organized needs to be expanded, as it is in Figure 3, which encompasses the time dimension and differentiates the immediate and remote features of the political environment. Figure 3 suggests that the fourth reservation about the utility of studying personality and politics–the claim that social backgrounds are more important than psychological characteristics–is grounded in a confusion which can be readily dissolved. The social backgrounds of political actors (panel 2 of Figure 3) influence their actions, but only as mediated by the individual's developing predispositions (panel 3) and the different levels of personality they shape (panels 4, 5 and 6). Thus, to take a final example from the literature on student protest in the 1960s, it was fallacious (as Block *et al.* 1969, pointed out at the time) for Lipset (1968) to argue that because so many student activists were young, middle-class Jews, personality was not an important determinant of activism. To the extent that Jewish background was connected with activism, it had to be part of a causal sequence in which developmental experiences specific to Jews contributed to their psychological orientations. The latter, not Jewish background *per se,* would have been the mediator of behaviour.

The study of how ethnicity, class and other of the so-called background characteristics affect political behaviour is important and highly relevant to (but no substitute for) the study of personality and politics. To the extent that a characteristic becomes part of an actor's personal make-up, it is no longer 'background'–it is an element in the psyche. But evidence of whether background experience distinguishes members of one social group from those of others is grist for political psychologists. Lipset may have been correct in sensing that Jewish political activists of the 1960s had some distinctive qualities that were important for their behaviour, but the observation that many student

Macroenvironment

Microenvironment

Predisposition

Past | Present | Future

1 Historical conditions

8 Current state of society and polity

2 Socializing agents and social background

7 Current state of immediate environment

3 Developing predispositions (including perceptions, conscious orientations, functional bases, and biological underpinnings)

6 Perceptions of the environment

5 Conscious political and politically relevant orientations (political and politically relevant cognitive, affective, and conative dispositions—e.g., identifications, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, values, ideology, stereotypes, etc.)

4 Functional bases of conscious orientations – basic personality structures:
1 cognition and needs
2 mediation of self–other relationships
3 ego defences

Biological underpinnings of personality, temperament, physiological state, genetic inheritance, etc.

9 Political responses

12 Future states of society and polity

11 Future states of immediate environment

10 Future states of predispositions

Figure 3 A comprehensive map for the analysis of personality and politics

protesters were Jewish not only fails to prove this, it also forecloses systematic inquiry.

An appropriate programme of inquiry into Lipset's claim would entail specifying the precise psychological dynamics that ostensibly make Jewish protesters distinctive and comparing Jewish and non-Jewish protesters with comparable non-protesters in order to determine whether the imputed patterns existed. If they did, one would want to know whether they resulted from particular developmental histories, whether they had predictable consequences for political behaviour, and why some Jews protested and some did not. Whether a distinctly Jewish psychology of political protest exists is an empirical question, and is part of a broader set of questions that can be asked about how group membership affects personality and political behaviour.

THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY ON EVENTS

The last of the reservations about the study of personality and politics derives from the view that individuals are not likely to have much impact on events. Such a premise underlies many theories of history. In the nineteenth century the question of whether historical actors have an impact on events was the basis of a fruitless grand controversy, with such social determinists as Herbert Spencer denying the efficacy of historical actors and such 'Great Man' theorists as Thomas Carlyle proclaiming their overriding importance (Kellerman 1986:3–57). Contemporary leadership theorists typically describe themselves as interactionists, emphasizing the interdependence of leaders and their environments and the contingent nature of the leader's impact on larger events (Burns 1978; Tucker 1981).

The debate about whether actors can shape events is about the causal chain from personality (panels 4–6 of Figure 3), through political response (panel 9), to future states of the immediate and more remote political and social environment (panels 11 and 12). Claims that particular actors did or did not have an impact on events usually prove to be claims about actor dispensability and action dispensability (Greenstein 1969:40–6)–that is, about whether the actions of the individuals in question were necessary for the outcome to have occurred or whether the actions were ones that any similarly placed actors would have taken. The second issue is one I have already explored under the heading of personality and environment, but the first requires clarification.

The capacity of actors to shape events is a variable, not a constant. The sources of variation parallel the determinants of success in the game of pool. The number of balls a player will be able to sink is in part a function of the location of the balls on the table. The parallel in politics is the malleability of the political environment (Burke and Greenstein 1989:24). The second determinant of

success in the pool room is the position of the cue ball. This is analogous to the actor's position in the relevant political context. Roosevelt and Gorbachev could not have had an impact from lower-level administrative positions. The third class of variable has the same labels in the games of pool and politics—skill, self-confidence and the other personal requisites of effective performance.

KINDS OF PERSONALITY AND POLITICS ANALYSIS

Every human being is in certain ways like all other human beings, in certain ways more like some human beings than others, and in certain ways unique (Kluckhohn and Murray 1953). Each of these resemblances is reflected in a different kind of personality-and-politics analysis. The universality of human qualities is explored in writings that seek in some broad way to make the connection stated in the title of Graham Wallas's *Human Nature and Politics* (Wallas 1908). Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents* (Freud 1930), Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (Fromm 1941), Norman O.Brown's *Life Against Death* (Brown 1959) and Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* (Marcuse 1966) are notable contributions to this tradition. At their best such works provide fascinating and provocative perspectives on the human condition. Many of them are rich in insights that suggest testable hypotheses.

Because they seek to explain the variable phenomena of political behaviour with a constant, such efforts are not themselves subject to confirmation or disconfirmation. In contrast, it *is* possible to conduct systematic, replicable inquiries into political actors' unique qualities (single-case analysis) and the qualities that make them more like some individuals than others (typological analysis). The ways in which individual and typical political psychology affects the performance of political processes and institutions (aggregation) can also be studied systematically.

Single-case personality analysis is more important in the field of personality and politics than it has come to be in personality psychology generally, because students of politics are concerned with the performance of specific leaders and their impact on events. There have been noteworthy personality-and-politics studies of leaders as diverse in time, culture and the circumstances of their leadership as Martin Luther (Erikson 1958), Louis XII (Marvick 1986), Woodrow Wilson (George and George 1956), Kemal Ataturk (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1984) and Josef Stalin (Tucker 1973), as well as many others. There also have been valuable single-case psychological analyses of figures whose political importance derives from their impact on leaders—for example, George and George's analysis of the influence of Colonel Edward House on Woodrow Wilson (George and George 1956) and Kull's of US defence policy advisers (Kull 1988). In addition, there is a tradition in the field of personality and politics

of single case analyses of 'faces in the crowd'–people who are without policy influence but who illustrate in depth the psychological process that can only be examined more superficially in surveys (Riesman and Glazer 1952; Smith *et al.* 1956; Lane 1962).

Typological study of political and other actors is of potentially great importance: if political actors fall into types with known characteristics and propensities, the laborious task of analysing them *de novo* can be obviated, and uncertainty is reduced about how they will perform in particular circumstances. The notion of a psychological *type* can be stretched to include all efforts to categorize and compare the psychology of political actors, even straightforward classifications of the members of a population in terms of whether they are high or low on some trait such as ego strength, self-esteem, or tolerance of ambiguity. The more full-blown political psychology typologies parallel diagnostic categories in medicine, including psychiatry. They identify syndromes–patterns of observable characteristics that reflect identifiable underlying conditions, result from distinctive developmental histories and have predictable consequences.

Of the many studies that employ the first, simpler kind of psychological categorization, the studies by Herbert McClosky and his students are particularly valuable because of their theoretical and methodological sophistication and the importance of the issues they address (McClosky 1967; Di Palma and McClosky 1970; Sniderman 1974; McClosky and Zaller 1984). Political personality typologies of the second, more comprehensive variety go back at least to Plato's account in the eighth and ninth book of *The Republic* of the aristocrat, the democrat, the timocrat and the tyrant–political types that Plato believed were shaped in an intergenerational dialectic of rebellion of sons against their fathers' perceived shortcomings. (For a gloss on Plato's account see Lasswell 1960.) Latter-day typologies that have generated important bodies of literature are the authoritarian, dogmatic and Machiavellian personality classifications (Adorno *et al.* 1950; Rokeach 1960; Christie and Geis 1970). Within political science the best-known personality typology is James David Barber's classification of the character structures of American presidents (Barber 1985).

Single-case and typological studies alike make inferences about the inner quality of human beings (panels 4, 5 and 6 of Figure 3) from outer manifestations–their past and present environments (panels 1, 2, 7 and 8) and the pattern over time of their political responses (panel 9). They then use those inferred constructs to account for the very same kind of phenomena from which they were inferred–responses in situational contexts. The danger of circularity is obvious, but tautology can be avoided by reconstructing personality from some response patterns and using the reconstruction to explain others.

The failure of some investigators to take such pains contributes to the controversial status of the personality-and-politics literature, as does the

prevalence of certain other practices. Some biographers, for example, impose diagnostic labels on their subject, rather than presenting a systematic account of the subject's behaviour in disparate circumstances (George 1971). Some typological analysts categorize their subjects without providing the detailed criteria and justifications for doing so. Some analysts of individuals as well as of types have engaged in the fallacy of observing a pattern of behaviour and simply attributing it to a particular developmental pattern, without documenting causality, and perhaps even without providing evidence that the pattern existed. Finally, some analysts commit what might be called the psychologizing and clinical fallacies: they explain behaviour in terms of personality without considering possible situational determinants, or conclude that it is driven by psychopathology without considering other psychological determinants, such as cognition. Both fallacies are evident in the body of literature attributing the high scores of poor blacks and other minorities on the paranoia scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to emotional disturbance. The scores appear actually to have reflected cognitively based responses to the vicissitudes of the ghetto environment (Gynther 1972; Newhill 1990).

It is not surprising that some personality-and-politics studies are marked by methodological shortcomings. Certain of the inferences mapped in Figure 3 pose intrinsic difficulties. Claims about the determinants of personality characteristics (that is, of the connections between panels 1 and 2 and panels 3–6) are unlikely to be conclusive. Characterizations of personality structures themselves are never wholly persuasive, if only because of the absence of uniformly accepted personality theories with agreed-upon terminologies. Fortunately, the variables depicted in Figure 3 that *can* be characterized with great confidence are those closest to and therefore most predictive of behaviour: the environments in which political action occurs (panels 7 and 8) and the patterns that action manifests over time (panels, 9, 10, etc.). Those patterns are themselves variables, and they can be treated as indicators of an important further dimension of personality and politics—*political style*.

Two examples of political biographies that provide impressively comprehensive accounts of the precise patterns of their subjects' behaviour are Walter's study of the Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (Walter 1980) and Landis's of Senator Joseph McCarthy (Landis 1987). Richard Christie's studies of the types of people who manifest the Machiavellian syndrome (Christie and Geis 1970)—the characterological proclivity to manipulate others—provide a model of careful measurement and theoretically sophisticated analysis in which contingent relationships are carefully explored. People who score high on tests of Machiavellianism do not differ in their behaviour from non-Machiavellians in all contexts, only in contexts in which their manipulative impulses can be effective—for example, in situations that permit improvisation and in situations requiring face-to-face interaction.

Personality is likely to interest most political scientists only if it has aggregate consequences for political institutions, processes and outcomes. The literature on the aggregate effects of personality on politics is varied because the processes of aggregation are varied. Broadly speaking, political psychology affects the performance of political systems and processes through the activities of members of the public and the deliberations and decision making of leaders. The impact of mass publics on politics, except through elections and severe perturbations of public opinion, is partial and often elusive. The political impact of leaders and others in the active political stratum is, on the other hand, more generally direct, readily evident, and potentially momentous in its repercussions.

The first efforts to understand the psychology of mass populations go back to the accounts by writers in the ancient world such as Tacitus of the character of the members of remote tribes and nations. Such disquisitions are an antecedent of the vexed post-Second World War national character literature in which often ill-documented ethnographic reports and cultural artifacts such as child-rearing manuals, films and popular fiction were used to draw sweeping conclusions about modal national character traits. That literature came to be known to students of politics mainly because of its methodological shortcomings, but it anticipated later, more systematic studies of political culture (Inkeles and Levinson 1967; Inkeles 1983).

By the 1950s, there was broad scholarly consensus that it was inappropriate simply to attribute psychological characteristics to mass populations on the basis of anecdotal or indirect evidence. Direct assessment of publics through survey research became the dominant mode of studying mass populations. Studies like those of McClosky and his associates (McClosky 1967; McClosky and Zaller 1984) provided survey data on basic personality processes such as ego-defences and cognitive styles and how they affect political opinion. But basic personality processes have not been persuasively linked to the aspect of mass behaviour that most clearly and observably has an impact on political institutions and processes–electoral choice. Most members of the general public appear to be too weakly involved in electoral politics for their voting choices to tap deeper psychological roots, and many of those who are involved appear to take their cues from party identifications formed in their early years and from short-run situational stimuli.

If what is commonly thought of as personality is not linked to electoral choice, attitudinal political psychology most definitely is. The literature on electoral choice (Niemi and Weisberg 1984) is too vast to begin to review here, but the research of Kelley (1983) is of particular interest in that it is explicitly aggregative; it reveals the precise distributions of attitudes and beliefs about issues and candidates that were associated with post-Second World War American election outcomes. So is the research of Converse and Pierce (1986), who have convincingly linked certain attributes of the French political system to

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the distinctive ways members of that nation's electorate orient themselves to political parties.

In contrast to the ambiguous links between mass publics and political outcomes other than in elections, the connections between political decision makers and political outcomes are direct and palpable. Nevertheless, many historical reconstructions of political decision making are insufficiently specific about which actors in what precise contexts took which actions with what consequences. Sometimes the historical record does not contain the appropriate data. Often, however, the difficulty lies not with the record but with the way in which it has been analysed.

The questions the analyst needs to ask of the historical record are suggested by the analytic distinctions of *actor* and *action dispensability:* Were the actions a decision maker took those that any individual placed in a comparable context would have taken? That is, were they imposed by the actor's situation? Did those actions make a difference? That is, would the outcome have been the same if they were not taken? Questions of actor dispensability call for examination of the contexts in which the decision makers act. Questions of action dispensability call for reconstructions of the determinants of particular outcomes and assessment of the part particular actors played in them.

A good example of a reconstruction that addresses both questions is the analysis by George and George (1956) of Woodrow Wilson's role in the crisis over ratification of the Versailles Treaty. The intense, uncompromising qualities of Wilson the man, at least in certain kinds of conflicts, are an essential part of any account of the ratification fight. There is abundant evidence that the political context did not impose a course of action on Wilson that would have kept him from achieving his goal of ratification. All that was required was that he accept certain nominal compromises that his supporters urged upon him, pointing out that they had no practical significance. Moreover, Wilson's actions are necessary to explain the outcome. Wilson's supporters were lined up for a favourable ratification vote, but were unprepared to act unless he authorized them to accept mild qualifying language. This he refused to do.

The explanatory logic of propositions about whether an individual's actions and characteristics were consequential in some episode is that of counterfactual reasoning. This is the only available alternative in analyses of single events to the quantitative analysis that would be called for if data existed on large numbers of comparable episodes. Counter-factual reasoning is not falsifiable, but it can be systematic. To be so it must be explicit and addressed to bounded questions—not conundrums about remote contingencies. 'Was Lyndon Johnson's action necessary for the 1965 American escalation in Vietnam to have occurred?' is an example of a question that is susceptible to investigation (Burke and Greenstein 1989). 'If Cleopatra's nose had been an

inch longer, how would world history have been changed?' is an example of one that is not.

Personality and political psychology more generally affect political processes not only through the actions taken by leaders more or less on their own, but also through group processes such as the collective suspension of reality testing manifested in what Irving Janis (1982) has characterized as groupthink. Groupthink occurs in highly cohesive decision-making groups. The members of such groups sometimes become so committed to their colleagues they more or less unconsciously suspend their own critical faculties in order to preserve group harmony. Janis, who is scrupulous about setting forth the criteria for establishing whether a group has engaged in groupthink, analyses a number of historical episodes (the most striking example being the Bay of Pigs) in which a defective decision-making process appears to have led able policy makers to make decisions on the basis of flawed assumptions and defective information. To the extent that groupthink is a purely collective phenomenon, emerging from group interaction, it is a manifestation of social psychology rather than personality psychology. But, as Janis suggests, personality probably contributes to groupthink in that some personalities are more likely than others to suspend their critical capacities in group settings.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Political institutions and processes operate through human agency. It would be remarkable if they were *not* influenced by the properties that distinguish one individual from another. In examining that influence, this article has emphasized the logic of inquiry. It does not constitute a comprehensive review of the literature. For a variety of useful reviews and compendia, readers should consult Greenstein and Lerner (1971), Knutson (1973), Stone (1981), Herman (1986) and Simonton (1990).

To the extent that this article brings out possible pitfalls in studies of personality and politics, its message to cautious scholars may seem to be: find pastures that can be more easily cultivated. Even daring scholars might conclude that the prospects for the systematic study of personality and politics are too remote to justify the investment of scholarly time and effort. Nothing in this article is meant to support such conclusions. In a parable on the shortcomings of scientific opportunism, Kaplan (1964:11, 16–17) relates the story of a drunkard who lost his keys in a dark alley and is found searching for them under a street lamp, declaring, 'It's lighter here'. The drunkard's search is a poor model. If the connections between the personalities of political actors and their political behaviour are obscure, all the more reason to illuminate them.

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INTEREST GROUPS

HARMON ZEIGLER

Interest groups are formal organizations that seek to influence public policy in democratic polities. That is all they are, and to be more precise is to become more inaccurate. Other definitions, using phrases such as 'shared attitudes', 'cohesion' or even 'representation', can be shown to be wrong.

Interest groups are indigenous to open societies. However, their methods of organization, their claims upon their members' loyalties, their techniques of asserting their demands, and their success in achieving their goals vary with the political culture in which they operate. The two modes of political culture most used for the understanding of interest groups are pluralism and corporatism.

PLURALISM

Interest groups are the linchpin of pluralist theory. For pluralists they are transformed from unavoidable evils in the mind of Madison (1961) to agents of connection. At the very core of pluralist theory is belief that individuals can best convey their needs and desires to the government through concerted group activity. In a large, complex society one stands little chance of being heard—much less of affecting the governmental decision-making process. But, so the argument runs, when many people who share a particular concern coalesce, their collective opinion speaks with more authority than the sum of their individual voices. Thus pluralists view interest groups as channels through which people realize the democratic ideal of legitimate and satisfying interaction with government:

> Voluntary associations are the prime means by which the function of mediating between the state and the individual is performed. Through them the individual is able to relate…effectively and meaningfully to the political system.
>
> (Almond and Verba 1965:245)

Dahl argues that autonomous organizations are 'necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself, to minimizing government coercion, to political liberty, and to human well-being' (Dahl 1982:1). This is very different from Madison, who praised the potential of the new American government to 'break and control the violence of faction' and to control the 'mischiefs' of factions (Madison 1961:77–8).

PROBLEMS OF PLURALISM

Critics of pluralism assert that the very organizations said to provide a linkage between rulers and ruled are themselves undemocratic. One such critic suggests that 'the voluntary associations or organizations that the early theorists of pluralism relied upon to sustain the individual against a unified omnipotent government have themselves become oligarchically governed hierarchies' (Kariel 1961:74). But this criticism is facile, and even distorts the position of the pluralists. Indeed, pluralism never claimed that mass participation was necessary or even possible. 'Competing elites', a phrase often used by pluralists, encompasses the notion of the undemocratic organization serving a legitimate representative function.

Equality of political resources

According to the pluralist canon, people join groups because they expect that it is to their political advantage to do so. Pluralism thus assumes that people are rational self-maximizers, just as does the abstract social contract (between people and government) of Hobbes and Locke. Tacitly, they presume that organizations are easily formed in response to individual demands (Marsh 1976:258). Organization breeds counter-organization. Although critics (Newton 1976) allege that the 'organization equals counter-organization' contention implies political equality, leading pluralists deny this to be the case. Truman (1951) did not explicitly address inequality, but Dahl (1982) did. Conceding that a 'regrettably imprecise' sentence ('I defined the "normal" American political process as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively in the process of decision') in *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Dahl 1956:145) led the opponents of pluralism to argue that he believed in political equality, Dahl rejects the proposition (equality of resources) as 'absurd' (Dahl 1982:207). Jack Walker proved just how absurd such notions are (Walker 1983:398) by documenting how extraordinarily difficult and expensive the creation of organizations can be: it takes time, money, 'boldness', and generally an 'angel' or two.

Yet, even with Dahl's disclaimer, and the even stronger repudiation by his co-pluralist, Charles Lindblom (1977), the problem of equality continues to vex pluralists. As Manley explains:

> Unless power is de-centralized among many groups, pluralism is falsified, and some form of elite theory or class analysis better fits the empirical facts…it is hard to see how pluralism can dispense with the notion of some sort of balance, some sorts of rough parity of countervailing power.
>
> (Manley 1983:378)

Thus, pluralists must either accept an 'absurd' premise or abandon their theory.

The decision to participate

More serious is the assertion that people's reasons for joining a group are not, as pluralists assume, political. Pluralism accepted, without really giving alternative possibilities much thought, the idea that people joined groups to achieve public policy aspirations. Therefore 'interest groups are associations of individuals who share a desire for a contested political good' (Zeigler and Peak 1972:2).

Pluralists attribute more political interest to potential group members than is justified by the evidence. Besides, the mere existence of a joint interest in a collective good (shared attitudes) is not a sufficient condition for rational people to unite in organized group activity—or for an individual to join an existing group—unless the 'potential' group is very small. Such a person will realize that if others organize, the value added to the group by their membership will be insignificant. Also, since the good in question is collective (since policy choices ratified by public bodies are collective), people will benefit from an organized group's acquisition of the good regardless of whether they participated in the process by which it was obtained (Olson 1965:61). Since group membership is never without a price for the individual, no rational person will incur the costs of organizational participation unless the anticipated payoff resulting from such participation is appreciably higher than the probable payoff resulting from non-participation, and that the payoff exceeds the costs of group membership.

These arguments are in keeping with what we know about people's interest in politics. For most people, joining a group is a 'marginal act' not easily controlled by organizational incentives (Salisbury 1969:19). While there is an active strata of those who are politically active and aware, most people are more interested in their everyday life than politics; when the two coalesce, political activity may occur only to cease when the intersection recedes (Zeigler 1988:64; Rothenberg 1988:1144).

The everyday life versus political commitment dilemma is addressed by the distinction between collective good and selective good mentioned briefly above (p. 379). The former are goods that cannot be distributed selectively—to some

people but not to others. The latter are benefits derived from membership in an organization and thus can be denied to non-members. Members of the American Association of Retired People (AARP) cannot deny to non-members the benefits of universal health insurance, for which the organization lobbied. But they *can* deny to non-members reduced rates on pharmaceuticals, travel and insurance, which the AARP makes available, through mass purchasing arrangements, to its members. Thus, 'rational' retired persons (or rather people aged 50 or more) would not join for benefits that they could enjoy without membership (they can be 'free riders').

The implications for pluralism of personal motives in joining an organization are substantial. How can organizations be the link between members and government if people join to obtain selective benefits? If people join the AARP to get discounts on prescription medicine, can they be regarded as a political constituency when 'their' lobbyist testifies on a complex social security problem? If their lobbyist took a position contrary to that of a majority of members, would they instruct the lobbyist to stop? If he or she did not, would they resign from the organization?

> We can see that a group's formal membership is not a valid indicator of its political support…. Formal membership indicates that the group is successful at selling selective incentives, not that it is politically popular. Indeed, since selective benefits have nothing whatever to do with the group's goals, there is no guarantee that any dues-payers even agree with those goals. What could be farther from pluralist preconceptions?

> (Moe 1980:30)

Recent research has undermined some of these suppositions. In many organizations, selective benefits are the primary reason for joining, but in others there is a genuine political commitment. Doctors may join the American Medical Association to receive selective benefits, but women join the National Association of Women because they wish to support its programmes (Moe 1980; Zeigler 1988; Rothenburg 1988).

Additionally, the original arguments against the pluralists were developed by American economists using American examples (not, in Olson's case (Olson 1965), data) of individual choice. Since the United States is more individualist in mass and elite attitudes, less corporatist in governance, and more fragmented politically than most other industrial democracies, one naturally wonders if other cultures produce such self-maximizing, rational individuals. Although the evidence is far from comprehensive, there is ample reason to assume that other political cultures are inhabited by interest groups whose members are 'irrational' according to the norms of economic maximization. In the United Kingdom, not a good example of corporatism or collectivism, Marsh found that while the small businesses who joined the Confederation of Business did so for services, that is,

selective benefits, large firms did not (Marsh 1976:262; see also King 1985). In West Germany anti-nuclear protestors joined groups both because they believed themselves to be in imminent danger and because they enjoyed protesting (Opp 1986:106). And, as we have noted, in the United States, individual motivations vary with the nature of the organization and with the nature of the decision. The decision to *renew* membership may be dissimilar from the decision to *join* an organization, as it is apprised by more knowledge (Zeigler 1988; Rothenberger 1988). Generally, selective benefits become more important as membership is renewed, giving lobbyists more freedom; yet, since new members know less than veteran members about an organization's policy aspirations, they too are a weak source of constraint.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the intense exploration of individual motives for joining and renewing membership is that the notion of the economic person is too simple: people join for a myriad of reasons. Some organizations— citizens' groups for example—attract people who are genuinely concerned with political reform. Others—trade associations for example—attract those with a more personalized vision.

THE TWO MODES OF PLURALISM

Pluralism describes a political routine characterized by a roughly equal distribution of opportunities to acquire political resources, although not by the actual distribution of these resources. However, another understanding of the term, especially among European political scientists, is a system of multiple, competing interest groups that, through bargaining and compromise, contribute to the shape of public policy. This view enunciates a political process in which interest groups organize, attempt to influence, survive, or disappear, largely without the participation or encouragement of governmental bureaucracies.

Decisions are a result of elite bargaining and compromise. Elite competititon helps to safeguard individual non-participants from governmental abuse, since no set of interests is likely to be in the ascendant indefinitely. Thus a particular interest will win in some years, lose in others, and win on some issues, lose on others. Pluralism, then, is—besides being a process with at least the pretensions of balanced power—a loosely structured 'free market' system, with groups coming and going without negative or positive sanctions from the government. Although, depending upon the criteria employed, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Ireland and Italy have all been called pluralist, only the United States has consistently and consensually been so regarded (Wilson 1985:33).

While business associations clearly enjoy a privileged position (Lindblom 1977; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), the privilege is more a matter of money and prestige than of 'official' sanction or regulation. The very phrase 'pressure

group' implies that American interest groups do not have the ease of access afforded by quasi-governmental status and therefore must 'lobby':

> [Pressure groups] suggests a distance and a separation of function between business organizations and government that would not make sense in many countries…. [I]t remains more common to think of business organizations in [the United Kingdom and the United States] as outside pressure groups than as groups incorporated into the framework of government. This tendency is strongest in the USA.
>
> (Wilson 1985:128)

(See also Cox 1988:198–222.) What is true of business associations is even more certain for the less privileged groups: labour, consumers, civil rights organizations and the like. With freedom to organize but no guaranteed access, pressure groups gain their advantage by creating obligations and cashing in on them. Since the ill-fated reforms of the 1970s in the USA, the number of such groups–and their attendant political action committees–has increased exponentially.

With the free commerce in interest groups came doubts about the efficacy of interest groups for democracy. Having caused pluralist theorists to reassess the *representative* function of organizations, Olson also caused them to reassess their political consequences. He argued that 'distributional coalitions'–interest groups–doing what they do best, that is defending their interests, constrain the polity's ability to make difficult choices. Interest groups, unless they are subordinated to a more encompassing view, ensure economic decline (Olson 1982). Olson alleges that two examples of economic decline–the United States and the United Kingdom–establish his point. Of the United Kingdom, Olson offers the classic description of a pluralist group pattern:

> The number and power of its trade unions need no description. The vulnerability and power of its professional associations is also striking…. [L]obbying is not as blatant as in the United States but it is pervasive and often involves discreet efforts to influence civil servants as well as ministers and other politicians.
>
> (Olson 1982:77–8)

Clearly Olson's idea of pluralism is related not to the *distribution* of power but rather to its use: interest groups are not encompassing, therefore they pursue their (special) interest to the detriment of the polity.

As Olson simplified individual motivation, so he glossed over major *institutional* differences between governments, pluralist in *group* structure or not. Again, the United Kingdom and the United States provide an instructive example. A presidential, federal government with deteriorating party discipline is, in Rose's apt words, no government (Rose 1988:71). Echoing Theodore Lowi's lament (Lowi 1967, 1969), Rose asserts that the president cannot

'override the preferences of subgovernments [interest groups] in the name of broader national interests' (Rose 1988:71). Therefore, 'there is no government there' (ibid.). Parliamentary democracies, especially unitary ones such as the United Kingdom, do indeed have a government. They also have interest groups, quite powerful ones in the case of the United Kingdom, but 'the cabinet has the collective authority to hold subgovernments [interest groups] in check' (Rose 1988:71).

Thus the notion that interest groups destroy collective purpose seems flawed. Such a notion also exaggerates the divorce between interest groups and government in the world's most 'pluralist democracy'. As Walker (1983:399) and Ware (1989:110–11) have shown, organizations are often sponsored by the American national government. Additionally, the 'iron triangles'–tight policy networks with Congressional subcommittees at the hub–provide preferential access, albeit to groups that give them money. Nevertheless, fragmented sectors of the American government, including bureaucracies, are tightly aligned with interest groups. The point is that parliamentary governments can co-ordinate and subordinate the behaviour of interest groups, whereas pure presidential ones cannot. The American economic decline can therefore be blamed–partially– upon narrow distributional coalitions. Paul Kennedy, like Olson, blames interest groups that 'by definition' sabotage the public good (Kennedy 1987:524).

Beyond the American example one is hard pressed to illustrate the premise that interest groups are incompatible with broad images of the public good. In the United Kingdom, the Thatcher government took on the unions and substantially reduced their institutionally assured access (Kreiger 1986:36–58). Other countries–Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, Germany–have enjoyed vibrant economies while simultaneously encouraging vibrant organizational activity. It is not interest groups which enhance or impede a polity's ability to enunciate and achieve its goals, but the degree of co-ordination imposed or encouraged by the government, and the ability or failure of governments to weaken divisive groups (Richardson and Jordan 1985). In the United Kingdom, the economic decline lamented by Olson has been abated (Riddell 1989:168–84). As Richardson and Jordan conclude: 'Whether governments utilize the capacity of groups skillfully or turn the opportunities into opposition is the test of successful governance' (Richardson and Jordan 1985:291). Since Rose has insisted that as a pluralist, presidential system the United States lacks governance, it obviously cannot meet this challenge. A more structured pluralist, parliamentary system, the United Kingdom, does better. Corporatist regimes are said to be best at managing interest groups because they incorporate them directly and deliberately into the governing process.

CORPORATISM

Corporatist schemes are meticulously co-ordinated. In these countries:

> Important aspects of public policy are made after consultations approximating negotiations between government and 'monopolistic' interest groups with the exclusive right to represent employers and unions. Government generally plays an active role in shaping economic development through plans for the economy as a whole or individual sectors…. [T]he economic interests speaking for employers or unions should have a high degree of *influence*…in shaping government policy. Governments turn as easily to the leaders of employers organizations or the unions and perhaps more frequently than they turn to legislators or parties for advice, permission and approval in undertaking major policy changes.
>
> (Wilson 1985:12)

The government tailors and sculpts interest group operation. There are, however, degrees of co-ordination. Some systems–Switzerland, Japan, Austria, Norway and Sweden–are corporatist on a polity-wide basis. Others–Germany and possibly France (Keeler 1987)–are corporatist in some economic sectors more than others.

Problems with corporatism

The earlier, simplistic views of corporatism (Schmitter 1974) were obtuse and resistant to operationalization. More systematic studies (Keeler 1987:11) have developed a manageable understanding of the phenomenon. Keeler outlines the dynamics of strongly pluralist and corporatist arrangements and invites us to array governments along a continuum. His scheme is depicted in Table 1.

Keeler and others (Zeigler 1988:114) interested in empirically testable measures of the degree of corporatism suggest a *continuum* rather than an absolute classification. Keeler's continuum includes the following range of possibility.

Strong pluralism	Structured pluralism	Weak corporatism	Moderate corporatism	Strong corporatism

Countries can vary in corporatism by economic sector, as Keeler shows in relation to France. France was typically regarded as among the more pluralist of European political systems (Wilson 1985:907–9). Between 1958 and 1981, France moved from strong pluralism to structured pluralism in the labour sector, from structured pluralism to moderate corporatism in the business sector, and from structured pluralism to strong corporatism in the agricultural sector (Keeler 1987:19). West Germany's corporatist arrangements 'expanded

Table 1

	Strong	**Strong corporatism**
Role of the state in shaping the pattern of interest intermediation	The state plays no active role, serving as a broker *vis-à-vis* competing interest groups.	The state plays a very important role as an architect of political order, acting so as to bolster an official client group.
Nature of group–state interaction in the public policy-making process	Groups attempt to influence policy by lobbying decision makers. No groups are *formally* incorporated into the policy process.	The *official* clients benefit greatly from biased influence, structured access and devolved power. *Non-official* groups lobby (see strong pluralism).
Nature of intra-group (elite–member) relations	Group leaders respond (imperfectly) to member demands. Groups 'defend' their members against the state.	Elites unresponsive to member demands; leaders enjoy 'immunity' through state protection. Group acts as 'transmission belt' between members and the state, mobilizing members in support of policy and disciplining dissidents.
Nature of inter-group relations	Groups compete for membership and influence without state interference. Members join and remain in an organization because of the attractiveness of incentives.	The *official* client group enjoys an enormous competitive advantage, as the state provides it with resources or even makes membership compulsory. *Non-official* groups receive no such resources and may even be repressed.

and later contracted in response to changing economic and political conditions' (Hancock 1989:131). Thus, while France became more corporatist, West Germany became less so (Katzenstein 1985:368).

General patterns do allow an imperfect placement on the continuum. Just as the United States, even with the 'micro-corporatism' of the iron triangles, is conceded the most pluralist of the industrial democracies, Austria, Switzerland and Japan are rarely challenged as among the most corporatist. True, van

Wolferen argues that to regard Japan as corporatist is to 'render the theory almost meaningless' (Wolferen 1989:81). And unquestionably Austria's labour-dominated corporatist arrangement differs from Switzerland's business driven one (Katzenstein 1984). Nevertheless, no two countries are identical. Without doubt the United Kingdom's pluralism is very different from that of the United States. Few would argue with the following classification:

System	Examples
Strong pluralism	United States
Structured pluralism	United Kingdom
Weak corporatism	France
Moderate corporatism	Germany
Strong corporatism	Austria, Switzerland, Japan

THE CORPORATIST POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

Generally, corporatist governments recognize 'peak' associations—those organizations that represent a large population of smaller organizations. For example, a peak labour organization would include the building trades, truck drivers, electricians, and so on. A business peak association would include computer manufacturers, textile manufacturers, and the like. The component organizations do not engage in political activities in defiance of, or even in augmentation of, the peak association.

As the primary interest of corporatist decision making is economic—wages or incomes policies, international trade balances, deficits, and so on—only those groups directly related to such policies are invited to participate. As Keeler (1987:19) observes, others must resort to the traditional lobbying techniques of the pluralist political processes. Yet, pluralist systems also exclude, albeit with less certainty. This is especially true when some groups can claim a monopoly on expertise, as for example in educational policy making (Kogan 1975).

At any rate, corporatism is more 'officially' exclusive in granting the representative franchise. As an example, an informal collaboration between unions and business in Austria was institutionalized in 1957 as the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages. Labour representation to the Commission is from the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions and from the Chambers of Labour. The Federal Chamber of Business and the Conference of Presidents of Chambers of Agriculture represent business. The Austrian government merely provides the structure for interest-group bargaining and ratifies the decisions reached by the participating interest groups (Katzenstein 1985:142–4).

In the European corporatist governments, labour's governmental role is generally (except in Switzerland) firmly set, and it has no need to show its

muscle. Indeed, Marxist critics of corporatism allege that its fundamental goal is to de-radicalize labour unions. By entering into these agreements, labour groups are said to act contrary to the intentions that guided their origins; that is, they co-operate in the preservation of a stable rather than an inflationary economy by not pursuing excessive wage demands. Panitch believes that unions in corporatist arrangements are instruments of oppression. He is especially anxious to have proponents of corporatism lay bare their ideological bias, which he believes to be intensely anti-egalitarian, and calls our attention to the incompatibility of corporatism (which assumes the existence of co-operation between labour and capital) and Marxism (which assumes their perpetual antagonism). Unions must be able to assure business and government that their members will comply with the terms of the 'social contract' (Panitch 1977:61–90).

In classical Marxist thought the state is an instrument of oppression, initially at the bidding of the ruling capitalist class, and—in its transitional phase—of the proletariat. In corporatism, the state is not *necessarily* oppressive. On the contrary the state is liberating, in the tradition of Rousseau and the collectivist romantics. Corporatism is therefore compatible with authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes, but need not be so. Fascist governments can be corporatist as can democratic ones.

The fundamental idea of corporatism is that geographical representation is inadequate and that functional representation should replace or augment it. Governments create and sanction occupational associations of farmers, electricians, computer programmers and so on. In some forms of corporatism these organizations have been given authority for policy implementation; in others they are legitimately influential in policy formation. In Japan, Austria and Switzerland, for example, the distinction between public and private is uncertain. Austrian labour unions and Japanese manufacturers are as much a part of the governing process as are legislators and bureaucrats.

In Austria, for example, a decision to strike cannot be made by an individual union acting unilaterally, but only after a protracted and complex set of negotiations between peak associations. The unions eschew the ideologically loaded subject of inequality in exchange for maximum influence 'at the very highest levels in the arenas of economic and social policy most critical to Austria's strategy in the world economy; labour as a force for conservatism is of course not unique to Austria' (Katzenstein 1985:247).

In Switzerland, labour is equally conservative. Unions are weak, more akin to Japanese examples than those in left-corporatist governments like Sweden or Austria. The unions are non-monopolistic, much more so than is the case for business, and are rent by internal divisions (Katzenstein 1985:101). Since 1937, the unions and employers' associations have operated 'peace treaties', which amount to no-strike deals that also outlaw lock-outs and boycotts. These peace

agreements rarely go beyond the local level. The federal government stays out, and the national unions and employers' associations have rights for binding arbitration. They have 'Swiss' power, probably more than do unions in Japan. Here again, the constitution provides for 'generally binding' agreements; unions may collect dues from non-members and bargains struck by the unions and employers bind all workers. The agreements are thus public law. Unions and business groups unite to maintain the (somewhat) discriminatory treatment of foreign workers (25 per cent of the work force), without which the unemployment rate would be far higher than it is. Labour's ostensible ally, the Social Democrats, committed themselves to various (unsuccessful) referenda to improve the status of foreign labourers. This cosy pact means there are almost no strikes.

Corporatism's politics of exclusion are not therefore in the traditional rhetoric of Marxism, although these politics co-opt workers who might otherwise be attracted to Marxism. Labour and business are *the* incorporated groups, not the various single-issue, citizens' and protest groups that scatter themselves across the landscapes of democracies. Corporatism embraces only those organizations that the economic division of labour creates; some students of corporatist societies virtually define corporatism in terms of the bargain struck with organized labour. It is primarily the labour movement that extracts concessions from the government or wins concessions by allying with other interest groups. Corporatism is an alliance between *economic* interest groups.

CORPORATISM AND DEMOCRACY

Corporatism creates major incentives by granting quasi-official status to economic interest groups, and by connecting these peak associations directly to the appropriate government bureaucracies. The justification for corporatism is precisely its ability to remove policy from those without the expertise to comprehend complexity, parliaments or legislatures, and to transfer it to bureaucracies (those with a specialized expertise). Corporatism is designed to make policy immune from ideological passion, from partisan preference, or shifting public opinion. The adoption of corporatist mechanisms and processes was a conscious effort to ensure continuity in economic policy: 'What permitted stability…was a shift in the focal point of decision making. Fragmented parliamentary majorities yielded to ministerial bureaucracies, or sometimes directly to party councils, where interest group representatives could more easily work out social burdens and rewards' (Meier 1975:593).

CONCLUSION

Neither pluralist nor corporatist systems are superior in representing the view of members of voluntary associations. Whereas the reliance upon selective benefits is less crucial when membership is almost compulsory and access assured, no evidence or theory suggests that the functional representation of corporatism is more likely to be 'accurate' than is the 'accidental', *laissez-faire* mode of pluralist representation. As Keeler (1987:19) suggests, in pluralist systems elite response to members' demands is imperfect, whereas in corporatist systems elites can afford insulation.

Is either more likely to balance narrow interests against a large public good? Here the answer is less ambiguous. Corporatism can deliver more. As Wilson puts it:

> [Corporatist] systems have aroused the interest and envy of other states for some years now. Their success in securing above-average incomes and economic growth with lower than average inflation has fueled both admiration and envy…. [Corporatist] systems have provided their inhabitants with 30 years of high employment, low inflation, and considerable economic growth.
>
> (Wilson 1985:110, 113)

Of the United States, said by Rose to be so fragmented that it lacks a government in the true sense of the word, there is reason to assume that:

> America's economy has been slowly unraveling. The economic decline has been marked by growing unemployment, mounting business failures, and falling productivity…. America's politics have been in chronic disarray. The political decline has been marked by the triumph of narrow interest groups.
>
> (Reich 1983:3)

Corporatism is more fiscally sound, providing stable growth without massive debt (Zeigler 1988:99–100).

If interest groups—subordinated by corporatism or at least structured and balanced by unitary, parliamentary governments—are beneficial, and if they—inhibited by the impotence of strong pluralism—contribute to economic stagnation and decline, is this not a paradox for pluralism? For, as the linchpins of pluralism, interest groups are hastening its death. In an internationally interdependent economy, governments that can govern will prevail over those that surrender to narrow coalitions.

However, one can hardly attribute the rise and decline of economies solely to the relations between interest groups and the state. British economic decline since the 1870s is attributable as much to the accidents of empire as to narrow distributional coalitions. As the British empire and the industrial revolution developed simultaneously, the British relied more on their colonies for commercial and industrial development than did other, less imperialist countries.