ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Volume I

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ROUTLEDGE

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Taylor & Francis Group

Also available as a printed book
see title verso for ISBN details

that they may predict outcomes that prove false, create blind spots that lead to disaster, or generate expectations that go unfulfilled. When one culture falters, others are available to fill in the vacuum. Justifications or beliefs that once seemed powerful gradually (or perhaps even suddenly) seem to lose their hold. Witness, for instance, the significant increase in cynicism about government in the United States in the decades since publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). To stay as we were requires vast energy. Conceived as ways of life that are continually being negotiated, tested and probed by individuals, there is no reason why theories of political culture cannot make sense of change, long considered as the Achilles heel of cultural theories.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

A notion of political culture has existed as long as people have speculated about observable differences among countries or groups. Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Tocqueville are among the more prominent political philosophers who have tried to account for differences in government in terms of variations in a people's mores and temperament (Almond 1980:1–6). While these classic works in political theory provide the deep intellectual background for the concept of political culture, a more immediate impetus was provided by the anthropological studies of 'national character' pioneered by Ruth Benedict (1934, 1946), Margaret Mead (1942, 1953), and Geoffrey Gorer (1948, 1955).

This anthropological literature focused upon the unique configuration of values, beliefs and practices that constituted a nation's culture. Russian culture was different from Japanese culture was different from Chinese culture was different from French culture was different from American culture and so on. Comparison seemed beyond hope. Anyone who sought to draw parallels between one national culture and another (or, even more grandly, to formulate a universal generalization about human behaviour) was liable to have those whose stock-in-trade is the deep-seated particularities of a society immediately step in with their anthropologist's veto: 'Not in my tribe'.

If the concept of culture was to be of utility to political scientists, some classification of cultures was necessary. Perhaps the most influential was the typology of parochial, subject and participatory orientations presented by Almond and Verba (1963), who addressed themselves to one of the great questions of post-war social science: why, in the period between the First and Second World Wars, did democracy survive in Britain and the United States while collapsing on the European continent? A stable democratic policy, Almond and Verba suggest, requires a balanced political culture (the civic culture) that combines both a participatory and subject (or deferential) orientation to politics. Were everyone to participate in every decision, they argue, the political system

would be overloaded and governing would become impossible; were everyone to defer to their superiors, democracy would cease to be responsive to citizen needs and thus give way to authoritarianism.

The classificatory scheme advanced in *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963) enabled scholars to make cross-national comparisons among what had hitherto been regarded as unique national cultures. The categories could be applied to advanced industrial nations as well as non-Western, technologically primitive societies. Yet the book's research design—explaining divergent institutional outcomes in different countries—meant that the analytic focus largely remained, as in past anthropological works on national character, at the levels of the nation-state. Differences between, rather than within, nations have remained the central focus of inquiry of most research on political culture. Conflict within nations is left largely unexplained.

The tendency to attach political culture to nations persists despite strong evidence suggesting that variations in political attitudes and values within countries are often greater than those between countries. Introducing a recent book of essays on European democracies, Dogan, for instance, finds that:

> There is not a British civic culture nor a German, French or Italian one. The differences among countries are differences in degree, not of kind, differences of a few percentage points. The differences within nations appear greater than the differences among nations. There are more similarities in the beliefs of a French and German social democrat than between a French socialist and a French conservative or between a German social democrat and a German Christian democrat.
>
> (Dogan 1988:2–3)

Even Almond and Verba's own evidence suggests that differences within each country are at least as striking as the variation between countries.

GRID-GROUP THEORY

Perhaps the most ambitious effort to order the cultural variation within societies is the grid-group theory formulated by Douglas (1970, 1982). Beneath the luxuriant diversity of human customs and languages, Douglas argues, the basic convictions about life are reducible to only four cultural biases: egalitarianism, fatalism, hierarchy and individualism. Unlike other attempts at constructing typologies of political culture, Douglas's categories are derived from underlying dimensions.

The variability of an individual's involvement in social life, Douglas argues, can be adequately captured by two dimensions of sociality: *group* and *grid*. The 'group' dimension, explains Douglas, taps the extent to which 'the individual's life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership'. A low group 'score'

would be given to an individual who 'spends the morning in one group, the evening in another, appears on Sundays in a third, gets his livelihood in a fourth' (Douglas 1982:202). In contrast, a person who joined with others in 'common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation' would be assigned a high group rating (ibid.: 191). The further one moves along the group dimension, the tighter the control over admission into the group and the higher the boundaries separating members from non-members.

Although the term 'grid', as used here, may be unfamiliar to social scientists, the concept it denotes is not. In *Suicide,* Durkheim presented much the same idea in his discussion of social 'regulation' (Durkheim 1951: chapter 5). A highly regulated (or high grid) social context is signified by 'an explicit set of institutionalized classifications that keeps individuals apart and regulates their interactions' (Douglas 1982:203). In such a setting, 'male does not compete in female spheres, and sons do not define their relations with fathers' (ibid.: 192). As one moves down the grid, individuals are increasingly expected to negotiate their own relationships with others.

Strong group boundaries coupled with minimal prescriptions produce social relations that are *egalitarian*. However, because egalitarian groups lack (as a consequence of their low grid position) internal role differentiation, relations between group members are ambiguous. And since no individual is granted the authority to exercise control over another by virtue of his/her position, internal conflicts are difficult to resolve. Individuals can exercise control over one another only by claiming to speak in the name of the group, hence the frequent resort to expulsion in resolving intragroup differences. Because adherents are bound by group decisions but no one has the right to tell others what to do, consensus is the preferred method of internal decision making. Only active participation, each one counting as one but no more than one, can confer legitimacy on decisions.

When an individual's social environment is characterized by strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions, the resulting social relations are *hierarchical*. Individuals in this social context are subject both to the control of other members in the group and the demands of socially imposed roles. In contrast to egalitarianism, which has few means short of expulsion for controlling its members, hierarchy 'has an armoury of different solutions to internal conflicts, including upgrading, shifting sideways, downgrading, resegregating, redefining' (Douglas 1982:206). The exercise of authority (and inequality more generally) is justified on the grounds that different roles for different people enable people to live together more harmoniously than alternative arrangements do.

Individuals who are bound neither by group incorporation nor prescribed roles inhabit an *individualistic* social context. In such an environment all boundaries are provisional and subject to negotiation. Although the individualist is, by definition, relatively free from control by others, that does not mean that

he/she is not engaged in exerting control over others. On the contrary, the individualist's success is often measured by the size of the following commanded.

A person who finds himself/herself subject to binding prescriptions and is excluded from group membership exemplifies the *fatalistic* way of life. The fatalist is controlled from without. As in the case of the hierarchist, the sphere of individual autonomy is restricted. The fatalist may have little choice about how he/she spends his/her time, with whom he/she associates, what he/she wears or eats, where he/she lives and works. Unlike the hierarchist, however, the fatalist is excluded from membership in the group responsible for making the decisions that rule his/her life.

The categories generated by the grid and group dimensions possess the dual advantage of holding on to the best in previous research, thus cumulating findings, while opening up relatively unexplored, but important, avenues of cultural expression. Any theory of viable ways of life must be able to account for the two modes of organizing–hierarchy and markets–that dominate social science theories. Lindblom (1977) and Williamson (1975) are only two of the many scholars who have based entire bodies of theory on this fundamental distinction. Sensing that there may be more than markets and hierarchy, some organizational theorists occasionally mention 'clans' (Ouchi 1980) or 'clubs' (Williamson 1975), but these types do not come from the same matrix, built out of the same dimensions, as markets and hierarchies. A contribution of Douglas's grid-group typology is to derive the egalitarian and fatalist political cultures from dimensions that can also produce the more familiar categories of individualism and hierarchy.

Unlike conventional conceptions of political culture that focus on how patterns of belief and behaviour are passed on but neglect to explain why particular patterns are the way they are, Douglas's theory, by bringing social relationships and values together, offers an explanation of why members of some social groups find certain ideas plausible, while adherents of other groups do not. Political cultures, from this Durkheimian perspective, not only transmit but also form categories of thought. Rather than simply showing that different people, faced with the same situation, desire different things and confer a different meaning upon the situation, Douglas asks the crucial question: given that different people in the same sort of situation want different things, why do they want the different things they want?

STOLEN RHETORIC AND CULTURAL TRAITORS

Douglas's theory identifies which social contexts prevent the sharing of which values. The question thus arises of whether it is possible for adherents of culture A to use the rhetoric of culture B to support the positions of culture A. In

answering this question, it is important to distinguish between rhetoric that binds and rhetoric that leaves people free to do whatever they please. Peace and brotherhood do not bind; espousing competition, equality of condition, fixed statuses, fatalistic resignation, or renunciation of all desires does bind. For Soviet leaders to have proclaimed equality of condition as the guiding norm of their society, for instance, would have threatened the legitimacy of their rule. Consequently they both preached and practiced inequality, reserving equality for some distant future (Wildavsky 1983).

To use the core values of one's opponents in order to undermine those opponents and broaden one's own appeal is a path fraught with danger. Witness, for instance, anti-abortionists who attempt to discomfort their pro-choice opponents and appeal to those on the fence by referring to 'the equal rights of the foetus'. By insisting on the equal rights of all, anti-abortionists abandon (and hence undermine) their hierarchical commitments to the community's right to make distinctions among its members, and its duty to regulate the morality of its members. If it is illegitimate to make distinctions between a foetus and a child, then perhaps egalitarians are justified in denying that it is illegitimate to discriminate between humans and animals, men and women, old and young.

The perils of stealing rhetoric are further evidenced by the experiences of the American Whig party. Repeated failures in national presidential elections led many hierarchical Whigs to adopt the anti-authority rhetoric of the more successful Jacksonian party. Aping Jacksonian rhetoric did help the Whigs become more electorally competitive, but at the same time capitulation to Democratic rhetoric and categories of thought meant that they subverted their own preferred way of life. Within a decade the Whig party disintegrated, and the hierarchical belief system it institutionalized receded from the American political scene. In winning the electoral battle the Whigs lost the cultural war (Ellis and Wildavsky 1989:116–20).

Look at stolen rhetoric in reverse. If it were possible for adherents of each way of life to steal at will the more successful rhetoric of their rivals, we would today have much less variation than is apparent in the world today. Every individual or group would come to sound much like every other. Such a world would be not only homogeneous but unpredictable, for there would be little constraint on individual belief systems. Yet all of us know of people, whether we number them among our personal acquaintances or hear about them as public figures, whose actions and speech are so predictable that we can say what is on their mind and in their speech before they have an opportunity to reveal themselves. We can do this because values and beliefs come in packages.

If it is not easy to steal rhetoric and to use it effectively, is it still possible for individuals to adopt a position at variance with their current cultural bias without going over to one of the other ways of life? Our view is that to take a

position not in accord with one's way of life on an occasional issue does not make a cultural traitor. Were an individual to move beyond occasional disagreement into a pattern of disagreements, however, his/her cultural allegiance would be suspect. Were an individualist to feel, for instance, that there ought to be more protection against environmental oil spills and less logging of old stands in the forests, that person could probably still maintain an individualistic identity. But if that person went on to join the anti-nuclear movement, became upset about the release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment, saw water and air pollution as major threats to human health, and so on, it would become increasingly difficult to maintain his/her original cultural identity.

The reasons for this are both social and cognitive. Joining several environmental and safety groups, for instance, would put our individualist in contact with many people who held similar views on deforestation but who also held anti-individualist views on system blame, on poverty, on social programmes, on foreign policy, and a panoply of other issues. Anyone who has sat in a room for some time with people who differ not only on one or two issues but on a wide spectrum of issues knows that this is difficult to bear. Caught between rival ways of life, the would-be cultural traitor will feel pressured either to move back to whence he/she came or to become something quite different.

The other constraint on individuals stems from the interconnected character of belief systems. For an individualist to accept the proposition that the forest industry must be regulated is to make an exception to a preference for untrammelled self-regulation. If the exceptions multiply, however, the rule itself at some point begins to be thrown into question. To suggest, moreover, that the unfettered cutting of trees is bad is to acquiesce, even if unintentionally, in the egalitarian view that nature is essentially fragile and to call into question the individualist conception of nature as resilient. And if one comes to believe that the least little upset is sufficient to lead Mother Nature to wreak vengeance on the human species, it becomes difficult to justify to oneself and to others the decentralized system of trial and error upon which the individualist life of self-regulation depends. The interdependence of beliefs thus makes it difficult to reject a part without unravelling the whole.

WHAT IS POLITICAL IN POLITICAL CULTURE?

What, the reader might wonder, distinguishes culture from political culture? To what does the 'political' in political culture refer? Defining political culture as patterns of orientation to political action or objects sidesteps the question of what is to count as political. Some insist that all action is political. So, for instance, Leslie Gottlieb of the Council on Economic Priorities declares, 'shopping is political. Buying a product means casting an economic vote for that company'

(quoted in Bizjak 1989). If 'political' denotes power relations, then there is nothing that is not political, from child-rearing to marriage to attending school. If culture is by definition political, then the term 'political' is superfluous. To avoid this redundancy, students of political culture have attempted to define political culture as orientations towards government (as opposed to, say, the economy, religion, or the family). This conception includes attitudes about what government does (or should do) together with what people outside government try to get it to do.

As these competing definitions of the 'political' attest, the boundary between political and non-political is not graven in stone, inherent in the nature of things. Definitions of what is political are themselves culturally biased. When one person accuses another of 'politicizing' a subject, the disagreement is about how far the governmental writ should run. Constructing the boundary between political and non-political is thus part and parcel of the struggle between competing ways of life. Thus rather than join in a debate about what is 'really' political, we prefer to show how different culturally biased definitions of the political support different ways of life.

Egalitarians desire to reduce the distinction between the political and nonpolitical. Defining the family or firm as non-political or private, egalitarians believe, is a way of concealing and hence perpetuating unequal power relations. Egalitarians view the public sphere, in which all can actively participate and give their consent to collective decisions, as the realm in which the good life can best be realized.

Because individualism seeks to substitute self-regulation for authority, its adherents are continually accusing others of politicizing issues. Their interest is in defining politics as narrowly as possible so as to maximize that behaviour which is considered private, and thus beyond the reach of governmental regulation. Hence their reluctance to admit the egalitarian charge that private resources dominate public decision making, for this admission would imply capitulation.

If egalitarians see the political sphere as that realm in which human beings most fully realize their potential, the fatalist regards the political with nothing but fear and dread. The more power is exercised, the more they expect to suffer. Fatalists respond to their plight by trying to get as far out of harm's way as possible. Unlike the individualist, however, the fatalist does not discriminate sharply between the private and public spheres. Whether called public or private, the blows come without apparent pattern or meaning. The task of fatalists then becomes personal or at most familial survival, and they cope as best they can without trying to distinguish the source of their difficulties.

Hierarchists, for the same reasons that they approve of putting people and products in their properly ordered place, approve differentiating the public and private spheres. They frequently harbour an expansive view of state functions,

hence their conflict with individualists, but they insist, contra the egalitarians, that politics is not for everyone, but rather reserved for a qualified few. Where hierarchists draw the line between the public and private will vary, but that boundary is likely to be well-defined.

Running through these four ways of life shows that the type of behaviour or institution that is deemed political, or whether a boundary is even drawn at all, is itself a product of political culture. This suggests that the study of political culture (as distinct from culture generally) should pay special attention to the ways in which the boundary between the political and non-political is socially negotiated. It also means, more importantly, that political scientists must give up the notion that the distinction between politics and other spheres (whether economic, social or whatever) is 'out there' in the world, ready-made to be picked up and used. If, moreover, the boundaries between the political and non-political are socially constructed, then the study of political culture must assume a central place in the discipline.

POLITICAL CULTURE: AN EXPLANATORY PANACEA?

Is political culture an explanatory panacea, a universal nostrum, good for all problems, like some quack medicine? Surely, there must be subjects not amenable to cultural analysis. Suppose, for instance, a wall of water rushes towards us; presumably we would not need to resort to culture to tell us to get out of the way—self-preservation would be sufficient. Or would it? Even in this most extreme instance, where all involved are likely to agree on the danger, culture can have a critical role in explaining behaviour. A cultural theory may tell us why some individuals adopt an attitude of 'each for himself and the devil take the hindmost', while others advocate 'women and children first' or 'follow the leader', while still others decide that 'it's no use, I'll stay here'.

What is culturally rational may conflict with (and even lose out to) individual self-interest. Consider, for instance, the business firm that seeks governmental subsidies, thereby enriching itself at the expense of weakening competitive individualism. The NIMBY ('not in my backyard') syndrome for the location of potentially dangerous facilities might be another example of self-interest overriding cultural bias. But, lest we concede too much, we hasten to add that determining what is in one's interests is often an exceedingly difficult task. Deciding whether a nuclear facility endangers one's safety, for instance, depends on one's perception of risk, which in turn is a function of one's political culture (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Dake and Wildavsky 1990). A cultural approach does not try to deny the operation of self-interest as a motivation, but it does insist on asking how individuals come to believe where those interests lie.

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture is currently undergoing something of a renaissance (see Inglehart 1988; Eckstein 1988; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson *et al.* 1990). In large part, this is due to a dissatisfaction with the limits of rational choice approaches to human behaviour. Rational choice explanations are fine as far as they go. Our objection is not to explaining human behaviour in terms of individual efforts to realize objectives, but instead with the assumption that the objectives themselves require no explanation. Instead of a social science that begins at the end–assuming preferences and interests–a cultural approach makes why people want what they want into the central subject of inquiry (Wildavsky 1987).

If this renewed interest in political culture is to be worthwhile, future research must give sustained attention to the way in which institutions are related to values. People do not experience values apart from those who share them, or engage in social relations without justifying their behaviour to others. What is needed is not further wrangling over how to define culture but rather the construction of theories that will enable us to join institutional relationships and modes of perception, social relations and values. It is because Douglas's grid-group analysis does exactly this that we find her theory so promising.

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RELIGION AND POLITICS

ROBIN LOVIN

Religion gives individuals their most comprehensive ideas about reality and the meaning of events. Scriptures and oral traditions narrate the origins of the world and prescribe appropriate actions and attitudes in response to the cosmic order (Eliade 1969:80–7). Theologies and philosophies offer reasoned elaborations of the mythic premises, providing speculative systems that link contemporary events to the primal order and practical assurances that adherence to religious norms is not in vain. Ritual re-enactments and collective reflection secure a shared conviction that reality is as the religion has described it, and provide legitimacy for activities and attitudes seen to be in conformity to its requirements (Geertz 1973:90).

Politics is among the most important of these activities explained and legitimated by religion. In a great variety of historical and cultural settings, political order has been linked to a religious cosmogony, and political leadership has thus acquired a sacred status. The story of the sun goddess Amaterasu, for example, links the creation of the Japanese archipelago and the founding of the imperial dynasty, while the Chinese emperors derived their power from a 'mandate of heaven'. The Hebrew scriptures make no distinction between sacred and civil law, and obligations in the community rest on a covenant between God and the people. Meso-American mythology links the authority of the Aztec rulers to their role in the sacrifices that sustained the world order.

One might almost say that the primary relation of religion and politics is that religion legitimates the political order by linking it to a cosmic order of sacred origin. Yet differentiation and conflict between religious and political powers are equally familiar. Christianity spread through the Roman world in defiance of the imperial authorities, and European peasants in the era of the Reformation used religious change to demand a new order in politics and society. Today Islamic fundamentalists and Hindu traditionalists resist the modernization plans of secular authorities, while Japanese politicians debate the place of traditional Shinto rites in state ceremonies.

The historical relationships between religion and politics include differentiation, and even conflict, as well as legitimation. The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the theoretical frameworks in which these changing relationships have been understood. We will consider both functionalist and secularization theories, which offer differing accounts of a general history of religion's political role, and then turn to a typology that suggests a more pluralistic approach to the connections between religion and politics.

FUNCTIONALISM

The widespread tendency of political systems to draw on the legitimating power of religion has led some theorists to propose a functionalist account of religion's social role. Religions are identified by their power to inspire the attitudes and commitments that the political order requires, and any substantial transformation of the political order necessarily overthrows the religious regime as well. A new political order requires a new religion, and every political system will eventually generate a religious affirmation of its basic beliefs and requirements.

Explicit functionalist accounts of religion appear early in the modern era. Hobbes understood a 'Christian commonwealth' as one in which the sovereign controls religious ritual and doctrine with the same absolute authority that determines civil law. Here, the marks of a true prophet are the doing of miracles and 'not teaching any other Religion than that which is already established' (Hobbes 1968:412). Rousseau provided for a 'civil religion' *(la religion civile)* in his theoretical elaboration of a society that would provide for both individual freedom and social solidarity (Rousseau 1973:268–77), while Auguste Comte drew up plans for what he called 'positivism', a humanistic religion complete with nine 'social sacraments' (Comte 1891:90).

The functional religion that early modern thinkers provided as part of their programme of religious and political reform appeared to some later social theorists as an inevitable feature of any stable social system. For Emile Durkheim, Catholicism had in an earlier age served the social purposes that Rousseau and Comte anticipated for civil religion and positivism (Durkheim 1965:475). Historical changes may diminish the authority of a particular religion, or sweep it aside completely, but they cannot eliminate the need for a centre of devotion and enthusiasm that sustains moral unity in a people. Talcott Parsons draws on Durkheim's understanding of religion in his theoretical delineation of the role of religion in social systems (Parsons 1952:368). Robert Bellah utilizes the concept of a 'civil religion' existing alongside and independent of organized religious traditions to explain the elements of religious aspiration and commitment that have historically characterized politics in the United States (Bellah 1967).

From this perspective, the politically relevant religion is just whatever system of beliefs provides this unifying, inspiring, and, for Bellah, self-critical and self-correcting function (Bellah 1975:162). Alternative beliefs, even if they are more clearly related to a religious tradition, will either be rendered politically quiescent by the prevailing civil faith, or they will form communities of retreat and withdrawal for those who do not participate in political life. Thus, for example, churches in the United States typically draw sharp distinctions between an acceptable moral and religious witness on public questions and the unacceptable mingling of religion and partisan politics. In the post-war era in Eastern Europe, many churches explicitly accepted the 'leading role' of the Communist Party in political matters. A functional theorist might argue that in those cases, examination of traditional Christian groups would shed little light on the enduring relationships between religion and politics. To accomplish that, one would need to look at the civil religion or the Marxist ideology that had replaced the political functions of earlier forms of Christianity.

DIFFERENTIATION

Functionalist theories help to explain the symbolic significance of founding events to political ideologies by highlighting the analogies between these social forces and traditional religions. The Durkheimian effort to identify a unifying and inspiring function that would characterize all religion fails, however, to capture a differentiation between religion and politics that has developed in many historically important religions. Focusing attention on the beliefs and aspirations that bind a people together may obscure the political significance of religious systems that no longer sustain or have not yet achieved this central unifying role.

In addition to providing a 'civil religion' in the sense of Rousseau or Durkheim, religion may be used to legitimate the cultural hegemony of one group at the expense of others. Reformed Protestantism is sometimes used in this way in South Africa today, and Protestantism was used during the nineteenth century in the United States to legitimate the dominance of elites of British, German and Dutch over immigrants of Jewish and Roman Catholic background. A displaced religious tradition may sustain the aspirations of those who hope for a political restoration of the old order, keeping alive with religious hope movements whose realistic political chances have long since died. Hence Tsarist *emigrés* sought to gain control of Russian Orthodox churches outside the Soviet Union, and there have long been connections between French monarchists and Roman Catholic traditionalism. Religious traditions introduced into new areas can be vehicles of cultural and political transformation, as for example when Christian missions hastened modernization in parts of Asia.

Religion can also be a conservative force, resisting the efforts of political leaders who would exchange traditional ways for modern systems of production and economic development.

Most importantly, a religion which begins in close association with a particular people and a particular system of rule can assert itself as an independent centre of authority, leading to a differentiation within the society between moral or religious authority on the one hand, and political power on the other. Buddhism and Christianity, for example, both spread widely in their early centuries. Buddhism tended to cultivate support by the conversion of local rulers, while Christianity grew among the urban poor and middle classes. Both religions counselled obedience to political authorities, but each also established distinctive, highly organized structures of religious authority which resisted coercion and exercised their own influences on the rulers. The *Sangha,* the order of Buddhist monks, provided counsellors to the princes of India and South-East Asia and generated an important literature on the ideals of Buddhist rulership (Tambiah 1976:32–3). Christian bishops framed a network of local leadership that rivalled the organization of the Roman Empire.

The separation of religion and government is not inevitable, but once in place it tends to persist, even when subsequent developments once again produce close links between religious and political powers. Despite the tendency of modern observers to describe European Christianity of the Middle Ages or the Puritan communities of colonial New England as 'theocracies', it is doubtful whether Western Christianity has ever produced a genuine theocracy, in which all decisions are taken by a single authority applying a sacred law. Differentiated roles for religious and political leaders and a measure of respect for contextual political prudence have been important elements of both theory and practice, even where religious and political leaders shared the closest allegiance to the common faith.

Once religious and political authorities have become clearly differentiated, even their co-operation is marked by an inherent tension, and the possibility of religious delegitimation or political coercion is always present. The inescapable possibility of conflict between religion and politics colours even those moments when the two sources of authority enjoy the closest harmony and agreement.

SECULARIZATION

As an alternative to a single social function that defines religion's political role, other theorists have sought to identify a general pattern of historical development that links the fate of all religions in a variety of cultural contexts.

Here, too, the roots of the argument lie early in modern social thought. Hume hypothesized that monotheism developed from a polytheism based in primitive humanity's vulnerability to the forces of nature (Hume 1927: 269–73). In the

nineteenth century, James Frazer and Edward Tylor argued for the development of a rational, scientific world view out of the failures of primitive magic and superstition (Evans-Pritchard 1965:24–9). For these observers, the history, and perhaps the eventual disappearance, of religion was conditioned by the development of rationality.

Early in the twentieth century, Max Weber (1958, 1964) traced this development of rationality and its impact on religion in social terms. Weber's views grew initially out of his study of the emergence of modern European capitalism and its relationship to the ethics of Protestant Christianity, but this later gave rise to a general theory of history and of religion.

In developed industrial society, religion has a far less important role than in the pre-modern world of Protestant piety. The disciplines which once depended on faith are now imposed by the bureaucratic and economic structures on which we all depend for a livelihood, structures which create, in Weber's grim image, an 'iron cage' in which we are all confined, and where we shall remain 'until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt' (Weber 1958:181). Religion in such a society undergoes a process of secularization. A rationalized, historically developed form of religion triumphs, at least in the sense that its ethics are incorporated into the *saeculum*, the order of the world itself; but the beliefs, institutions and authorities of such a religion become irrelevant. They lose their power to shape events or to mitigate the demands of economic rationality.

Later developments of secularization theory moderate Weber's tendency towards economic determinism, but they continue to stress the demands of rationality on all ways of thinking. Ideas can be used only to the extent that they shed their pre-rational, affective orientation towards the world and make sense in terms of this modern understanding. Religious traditions may enhance our understanding of human aims and our appreciation of human dignity, but they can make these contributions only if they give up their historical particularities and the mythic presentations of their truth for the formulation of a rational morality (Horkheimer 1972:129–31; Habermas 1984:43–74).

Secularization theories call attention to important changes in the place of religion in modern society as contrasted to earlier ages and traditional cultures. The differentiation of artistic, economic and educational organizations from religious institutions reduces the importance of specific religious texts and symbols in intellectual and creative life, and religious leadership, like all leadership, becomes more specialized and professionalized. The prestige and authority once concentrated in religious institutions as centres of education and culture are now distributed among schools, museums, theatres and publishers, and the religious ceremonies that once provided generally shared opportunities for recreation and inspiration now serve the specifically religious needs of a limited number of worshippers.

THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION

There is a tendency, for research purposes, to measure secularization in terms of the decline of religious observance (Acquaviva 1979) or the changing status of clergy (Martin 1978:278–308). These may mark important social changes, but they do not directly reveal the fate of religious beliefs. For purposes of political analysis, the persistence of religious ideas as an opposition to forces of modernization, or as social ideals in a liberal democracy, may be as important as a falling away from traditional practices or the loss of clerical authority. Secularization theory should not be used in a way that uncritically interprets all measurable religious changes as signs of religious decline. When it is, the persistence of religious ideas will be missed.

This is particularly true where changes in religious practice have been enforced, subtly or openly, by economic or political powers that do not enjoy the loyalty of the religious communities. Sabbath observances, conscientious objection to military service, and the rejection of state-sponsored education are among the many overt expressions of religious beliefs which may be temporarily repressed by economic penalties or state persecution, only to emerge at a later date in demands for political reform and constitutionally protected religious rights. An assessment of the political importance of religion based on a measurement of participation during the period of repression would miss the potentially explosive power of the religious ideas to fuel revolt against persecuting authorities, or to demand political adjustments of educational, cultural and social welfare programmes to make them more acceptable to the religious population.

The vigilant, worldwide efforts of the Seventh-Day Adventists, linking their apocalyptic theology to campaigns for religious freedom and human rights, is one instance of the political significance of religious ideas in secular contexts. The emergence of fundamentalist movements in religions as diverse as American Protestantism and Shi'ite Islam provides an even further-reaching example of the persistence of religion in the face of social and cultural changes that appeared at one point to mark the triumph of modernity and Western rationalism (Marty 1988).

In addition to movements which seek to maintain religious beliefs and make them politically effective in the face of powerful or widespread opposition, the religious beliefs of private individuals may shape their political choices even where the political realm is overtly 'secular', for instance, free of publicly recognized religious symbols and norms. In those contexts, diversity of religious and moral beliefs, expanded options created by material wealth, and emphasis on individual freedom may encourage the development of procedural democracy, in which outcomes are supposed to be determined by rationally self-interested individuals making the case for their goals by offering publicly

accessible reasons. Those reasons alone, however, may not provide criteria for decisions about such important public questions as abortion, criminal justice and welfare rights. In such cases, private citizens and even judges and political leaders may have to rely on religious convictions to arrive at answers to the problems (Greenawalt 1988:12). A political analysis which considers only secular, public rationales without attempting to relate them to the religious convictions of the participants thus may miss important determinants of the outcomes.

Even more important, religious ideas are politically relevant in liberal democracies because they contribute to a broader social discussion of human aims and purposes. If the political choices of a procedural democracy are made by particular interests seeking limited policy objectives, the range of political possibilities is set by ideas debated more widely and over a longer period of time. Political choices may differ sharply over proposals to fight poverty with a negative income tax, or with 'workfare' programmes, yet the parties may share the belief that 'the justice of a community is measured by its treatment of the powerless in society' (National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1986:21). Religious thought may be divided or indecisive regarding the policy options, and yet be crucial to the development of the values that shape and limit the policy choices.

DIFFERENTIATION AND PERSISTENCE: A TYPOLOGY

Both civil religion and secularization tell us much about religion and politics in modern states influenced historically by Western Christianity. Any single explanatory model will, however, appear radically incomplete when used as a tool for understanding the interactions of religion and politics on a larger, global scale. Reliance on them will lead both political leadership and political scientists to overlook significant groups and individuals who, for the moment at least, neither provide functional support for the political order nor yield to the requirements of modern, rationalized social and economic life.

The principal reason why the relations between religion and society and the political impact of religion cannot be reduced to a single model is the persistence of religious ideas themselves. Formed in a religious context, ideas about personal morality, obligations to family and associates, the acquisition and use of wealth, and the legitimacy and limits of power have remarkable tenacity in the face of changing ideas about productive rationality or political expedience. Confronted with material circumstances or political opposition, the leaders and communities who are the bearers of these ideas may adapt and modify them to fit the new conditions, or they may resist and create alternative forms of community and loyalty that will allow them to maintain traditional values. Either way, political possibilities will be altered by the specific norms that are given importance in the

new social context, or by the presence of groups that challenge the functional social consensus.

The political implications of religious ideas thus require a number of models for the interaction. This theoretical pluralism can be represented in a typology. This has been well understood by historians, theologians and sociologists who have tried to understand the social thought of Christianity across the centuries (Troeltsch 1976) or to interpret the complexity of denominational Christianity in the United States (Niebuhr 1965; Roof and McKinney 1987). Ernst Troeltsch saw the history of Christian social teaching as the development of two basically different ideas about the relationship of Christian truth to social life, ideas he identified as 'church' and 'sect'. To those forms, present from the beginning, he also added a distinctly modern 'mystical' type, which fails to take the institutionalized forms characteristic of church and sect (Troeltsch 1976:729–802). H.Richard Neibuhr adapted this typology for constructive theological purposes, expanding Troeltsch's three types to a more differentiated five (Niebuhr 1956).

The need now, however, is for a typology that can be used for comparative purposes beyond the boundaries of Western Christianity. While Christianity provides us with important lessons in religion's adaptation to modernity, an account that draws the possibilities from Christianity alone will leave much out. The following typology is therefore offered as a scheme for organizing understandings of the relationships between religion and politics which may have some validity for other traditions and nations, as well as modern Western Christianity. It suggests five principal forms which that relationship may take, though as with all such schemes, the types may be found in many variations, and the boundaries between different types may in practice be difficult to determine.

Sacralizing religions maintain an unproblematic relationship of legitimation and support for the political order. Indeed, religious and political authority will not be sharply differentiated. These religions may have existed in some form from the very beginnings of an ethnic or national history, and continue to provide a distinctive sense of identity for a people as a whole. Traditional forms of Hinduism and Shinto, despite extensive changes through history, thus relate to the politics of India and Japan. In other cases, religious changes in historical times have taken place with such completeness that the events also represent a new political foundation. The expansion of Islam after 633 CE provides an example, as does, perhaps, the conversion of the Slavic peoples to Byzantine Christianity after *c*.860. In most of these cases, religious identity becomes a feature of ethnic or national identity, and the ruler assumes certain sacred characteristics.

Differentiated religions acknowledge important distinctions between religion and other spheres of social life, such as government, economics, family life and education. While religious norms and values may permeate the whole society, differentiated religions place limits on the extent of religious authority and specifically religious law and accord a relative autonomy to each of the spheres. Concepts of natural law or moral consensus may allow for co-operation with members of other religious groups on issues of justice and social welfare, without requiring religious unanimity. Indeed, where the differentiations between religion, law and morality are well-developed and long-standing, it may be difficult to determine whether a specific normative position is or is not based on religious convictions. Western Christianity, particularly in modern liberal democracies, provides the clearest examples of differentiated religion. Buddhism, however, has often taken differentiated forms as it has moved into new contexts and, as with Christianity, its capacity for differentiation and its relationship to a variety of political systems partly accounts for its success as a missionary religion. Despite the close connections that have sometimes prevailed between church and state, or between the *Sangha* and the king, it is possible for at least some adherents of these religions to speak of a 'Christian society' or a 'Buddhist society' in terms of its treatment of the poor and its limitations on the use of coercive force, and without a necessary connection to a particular form of political organization.

Sectarian religions maintain religious norms and values in the face of hostility or indifference from civil powers, or in dissent from the religious ideas of a dominant religious authority. Religious conceptions of the proper ordering of human life can adapt to a wide variety of circumstances, as differentiated religions demonstrate, but the religious ideas are not infinitely flexible. At some point, religious communities and leaders will see themselves in insurmountable opposition to the prevailing political or religious system, and they may at that point seek to preserve the possibility of religious life as an alternative community. Characteristically, sectarian religions withdraw from politics, eschewing both the burdens and the benefits of citizenship and striving to maintain economic self-sufficiency. While the religious community may itself remain politically inactive, preferring even persecution to a political defence of its interests, sectarian religions none the less pose unavoidable questions for political life about how far the claims and obligations of citizenship extend and what the limits of conscientious dissent from societal norms will be. Sectarian religions usually take the form of small communal communities, typified by the Essene communities of early Judaism, some Christian monastic orders, and the Anabaptist communities of the Reformation era. For some Christian theologians, however, a sectarian rejection of the values of an individualist, consumption-oriented society

marks an appropriate contemporary Christian stance (Yoder 1984). Similar movements can be found among contemporary followers of ascetic 'forest saints' in South-East Asian Buddhism (Tambiah 1984).

Fundamentalist religions arise when norms of identity and conduct characteristic of a sacralizing religion are in conflict with their social context. Typically, the new context overtakes the religious community by imposition from outside, or draws traditional believers into a new industrialized or urban environment by economic incentives. In fundamentalist religions, the difficulties the new context pose for traditional patterns inspire a systematization of belief and ethics and coercive enforcement of the newly formulated requirements on members of the religious community, as well as attempts to make the standards normative for society as a whole. Contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is the paradigm for the political realization of these demands, but some Protestant fundamentalists in the United States have made similar proposals. Hindu traditionalists also reject modern and foreign innovations, and the collapse of Marxist politics in Eastern Europe may create possibilities for the emergence of an Eastern Orthodox fundamentalism in traditionally Orthodox countries.

Individualist religions exist primarily in modern liberal societies that place a high value on individual freedom and may encompass many different religious traditions in the same state. Individualist religions thus reflect Troeltsch's observation that an individualistic 'mystical' type is the characteristically modern form of religious social organization, distinguished precisely by the fact that it does not create large, permanent religious institutions. While sectarian religions find the religious and moral neutrality of the modern secular state inimical to their religious life, individualist religions see it as a sphere of freedom in which persons can follow their own religious consciousness without seeking to impose it on others or making it conform to authoritative doctrines and practices. From the standpoint of more closely defined religious traditions, individualist religions often appear eclectic, even idiosyncratic (Luckmann 1970). Because individualist religions usually accept the differentiation of religious beliefs from systems of law, government, and even from the basic norms of social morality, their political activity and impact is generally limited to support for norms of individual choice and religious freedom.

In each of these types—sacralizing, differentiated, sectarian, fundamentalist, or individualist—religion provides the comprehensive explanations and orientations that enable people to understand their place in the political order as part of the ultimate reality in which they live and act. Because religious traditions hold definite ideas about that reality and are not merely social functions, the forms they can take and the politics they can support are limited, and specific traditions may become

closely identified with a particular religious form. Because major traditions endure through history and take root in a variety of cultures, however, they will assume nearly every one of the characteristic types at one time or another.

Understanding the political dimension of a religious tradition begins by comprehending the affinities between its basic orientation toward life and the world and the types of relationships to politics outlined here, and identifying the ways of relating to social order and political power that are most congenial to the conception of ultimate order and power that this particular tradition holds. Estimating the political impact of religious belief, by contrast, requires attentiveness to the new or unusual types of relationships to politics that a religious tradition may take on in changing economic and cultural circumstances. In the last few centuries in the industrialized countries of the West, those circumstances have largely favoured Protestant Christianity and other traditions which have historically tended toward the differentiated type of religion. Other traditions, notably Judaism, that found themselves in those circumstances have developed previously uncharacteristic differentiated types. Social theory, which emerged simultaneously with these developments, has charted them well, but has also lent a certain sense of inevitability to the rise of differentiated and individualist types of religion. As our attention widens to include more of the world's religious traditions, and as the material circumstances that marked the rise of modern industrialism shift dramatically, our understanding of religion must also expand to include other religious types and to anticipate their impact on politics.

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RACE AND POLITICS

SHAMIT SAGGAR

When the writer and sometime Pan African activist, W.E.B.DuBois, wrote that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line', it would be fair to say that he did not have the emerging research priorities of political science in mind. Throughout the course of the century, the relationship between race and politics has always tended to occupy a fairly esoteric status within the established political science literature. Whilst it would be misleading to claim that race has been ignored by the discipline, it is certainly the case that the interest of scholars in race-related issues has been led by other areas of concern. Racial conflict and related policy issues have not occupied a major strand within academic writing; however, the research that there has been in this field has been primarily focused on major–and more familiar–questions of political science and political philosophy such as democracy, representation and power. An illustration of this conditional interest can be seen in Myrdal's 1944 study of race relations in the United States, *An American Dilemma,* which clearly sought to address itself to the application of democracy in the first democratic nation (Myrdal 1944). Indeed, the more one examines the literature in this field, the more one is struck by the extent of scholars' interest in the subject matter for broader purposes.

Notwithstanding the latent motives underscoring academic research in this field, it is important to note that *specifically* political analyses of race and racism remain relatively sparse and underdeveloped compared with other disciplines of social enquiry. Chief amongst this larger and better developed literature has been the contribution of sociology and, to a lesser degree, social psychology and social anthropology (see for example Park 1950; Cox 1948; Barth 1969; Hechter *et al*. 1982; Weinreich 1986). However, these neighbouring and sometimes overlapping traditions are not part of our remit, which is, among other things, to explore the contribution of political studies of race and racism. A cursory glance at writing in this field will reveal a preponderance of research on, *inter alia,* non-white electoral participation, state immigration policy, public policy governing

minority-majority relations, race and class, and autonomous black political thought and activity. The greatest attention has tended to fall on the former two areas, whilst the emphasis of recent theoretical–and arguably more interesting and challenging–debates has been centred around the latter areas.

Before proceeding any further, it is important to signal that an essay such as this must be selective in its approach and coverage. It hardly needs to be said that this survey cannot hope to be comprehensive and that certain themes and debates are therefore given greater attention than others. The purpose is to draw together and discuss several central themes found in the literature, and to evaluate the broad trends in the volume of research which has grown rapidly in recent years. The interests of researchers, however, have tended to be patchy and clustered around several major topics and approaches.

The main body of this discussion comprises seven parts. First, a number of preliminary points are considered that serve to shape the nature of our survey of the literature. Second, an overview is presented of some of the substantial findings of research on race and politics. Third, the dominant institutional and behavioural framework of research in this field is examined. Fourth, attention is given to the largely neglected debate on race and political power. Fifth, the discussion turns to the contribution of Marxism and state theory. Sixth, the commonly overlooked work of students of comparative race politics is explored. Finally, the article concludes with a brief discussion of trends and priorities in the future agenda of research on race and politics.

MAPS AND COMPASSES

It is worth pausing to consider some of the foundations on which race has been a politically interesting subject of study. We cannot merely assume that the literature represents a uniform and consistent approach to race issues in political affairs. It does not. Moreover, a number of theoretical, conceptual and empirical approaches have characterized the study of race and politics.

First, explicit racial conflict has frequently been presented as a factor guiding research interest. Illustrations can be found in the writing on the US civil rights movement, non-white immigration to western Europe, and South African race relations (see for example Preston *et al.* 1982; Miles 1982; and Wolpe 1970; respectively). Whilst much of this material has proved to be illuminating, the theoretical basis for it has varied considerably. One such dominant theoretical approach has been the Parsonian functionalist tradition which purports an often unwieldy and rather deterministic societal-level explanation for racial conflict and its underlying causes. The specifically race-related aspects of racial conflict appear to hold little interest, and the overall thrust of this approach is weakened as a consequence.

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Second, much of the research has been governed by the familiar reductionist themes and principles of academic scholarship. Much sociological writing for instance, notably within the Marxist and Weberian traditions, seeks to account for and explain the relationship between race and politics in terms of detached and unbending theoretical criteria. Consequently it is rarely found embracing a multiplicity of explanatory approaches (see for example the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1982; Rex 1981). The result is that research is peculiarly handicapped by the lack of multi-theoretical approaches. Political scientists have been afflicted by such theoretical narrowness no less than their sociologist counterparts.

This leads to a third factor involved in this field of study: unlike the volumes of sociology or social policy literature, the political analysis of race and racism remains comparatively atheoretical. By this it is not meant that political scientists have been entirely unconcerned about theoretical questions to do with race, but rather that their efforts have tended to be fairly empirically-led and less noticeably bogged down in sectarian disputes of theory (so often a hallmark of the volume of sociological writing in this field). The problems encountered in the political analysis of race have undoubtedly been confounded by the relative absence of deep theoretical foundations. Political science research has consequently tended to become highly empirical in purpose and content, and rests heavily upon the much stronger theoretical foundations of sociological race research. For example, Katznelson's comparison of the experiences of racial politics in Britain and the United States, *Black Men, White Cities* (Katznelson 1976), although heavily theoretical in its scope and aims, appears to take its cue from a number of essentially non-political science debates. In noting the dearth of comparative studies of race and politics, Katznelson correctly emphasizes the obvious, yet often absent, centrality of politics to studies of race:

> By themselves, the physical facts of race are of little or no analytical interest. Racial-physical characteristics assume meaning only when they become criteria of stratification. Thus studies of race inescapably put politics–which, fundamentally, is about organized inequality–at the core of their concern.
>
> (Katznelson 1976:14)

Fourth, the study of racial tensions and conflicts has a number of obvious implications for political stability. Banton cites the example of Enoch Powell's critical contribution to debates in British politics on the question of nationhood in a multiracial society (Banton 1986:51–2). Claims about the supposed racial and ethnic building-blocks of the modern nation-state and worries about political stability were clearly at the core of Powell's message. Sensing an underlying concern for the viability of British nationhood in a rapidly transformed multiracial society, Powell argued that:

> Our response has been to attempt to force upon ourselves a non-identity and to assert that we have no unique distinguishing characteristics…. A nation which deliberately denies its continuity with its past and its rootedness in its homeland is on the way to repudiate its own existence.
>
> (quoted in Banton 1986:52)

Finally, political scientists, in common with social scientists at large, have turned their attentions to race with at least one eye on the need to formulate universal truths. In a number of cases they have failed to do so and the result has been a preponderance of over-generalizations about the link between race and politics. A further associated fault has been the extent of unrefined approaches to, and claims made about, racial and ethnic minority political action. To be sure, at the basic yet critical level of nomenclature, writers concerned with describing non-white political behaviour (all too) frequently speak of 'the black community' or 'black politics' and similar terms. The difficulty with doing so is that these overarching terms may deny the tremendous degree of internal diversity within such minority populations. In Britain, for instance, a strong debate has been generated on this theme, with several commentators at pains to stress the deep running yet historically smothered distinctions which exist between not merely Afro-Caribbean and South Asian-origin groups but also between sub-groups within these larger groups (see for example Banton 1977; Smith 1989; Robinson 1986). The argument is largely one concerned with preserving and resurrecting the notion of ethnicity in both practical and analytical terms. It is claimed that the distinction and precision of ethnic identity lies at the heart of the experience—and therefore politics—of these minority groups. Although it is indeed the case that the bulk of the literature stands collectively guilty of such myopia, we should none the less be cautious in our abandonment of the traditional race categories and relationships of social science enquiry. For one thing, the persistence of racially exclusionary policies, practices and routines, both by public agencies as well as by private groups and individuals, suggests that the emphasis should continue to rest with established racial umbrella categories, albeit at the risk of over-generalization (Blumer and Duster 1980; Husbands 1983; Smith 1989). Further, social science students of race should guard against the temptation of allowing their research strategies and priorities to be guided solely by the dictums of so-called grassroots action research. As Mason notes in relation to one example of such a research strategy (Ben-Tovim *et al.* 1986), 'what may result…is not so much research in the service of the oppressed as manipulation of researchers by minority interest groups or the rule of the mob' (Mason 1986:14).

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RACIAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

Many of the substantive studies of the race-politics nexus have tended to concentrate on a number of behavioural questions. These have included, for example, the relationship between racial groups and levels and forms of political participation, single issue interest group activity, and group mobilization towards areas of political protest and/or violence. Starting from this perspective, it is possible to see the different ways in which race has shaped not merely formal political processes but also a wide range of underlying social tensions including, *inter alia,* differential public service delivery and competition for scarce resources in urban political environments. Of course, the question that much of this research leads to is the extent to which race plays either a determining or consequential role. Or put another way, do black people in the United States or South Africa differ from their white counterparts in terms of the level and type of public service consumption or political participation as a result of their racial background or because of other factors such as economic or educational status? In terms of the research that has been carried out on this broad question, it seems that, whilst a certain amount of correlation between race and political behaviour has been established, the task of demonstrating causal explanation has proved more difficult.

Arguably the significance of race as a concept stems from its potential as an exclusionary variable. Thus its capacity to give focus to shared values and backgrounds cannot be underestimated, since, unlike other similar variables, it usually operates in an unambiguous, dichotomous manner. Social class, ethnic group, regional origin, generational cohort and other familiar variables of political analysis differ from race in that they exhibit various degrees of internal overlap and conceptual imprecision. In contrast, the political impact of race, whilst regularly burdened by theoretical and empirical confusion with that of collective ethnic group action, has been analysed in rather clearer and more tangible terms. To take the well-documented example of residential segregation between black and white communities in the United States, researchers have encountered *relatively* few methodological difficulties in assigning individual behaviour to forms of group cohesion. The difficulty that arises is being able to account for political action based on such cohesion, particularly in the absence of external constraints fuelling racially specific shared interests such as legally sanctioned force (as in South Africa since the early 1960s) or technical obstacles to electoral participation (as in parts of the United States until the mid-1960s). It is not sufficient to suppose that discrimination alone will result in collective political action on the basis of race. The processes behind such action, if it is to occur, are commonly more complex and involve a wide range of social interaction between, and political integration of, different racial groups (Verba and Nie 1972:149–73).

The voting behaviour of black minority groups in advanced industrial states appears to confirm this point. Crewe (1983), Studlar (1983), Williams (1982) and St Angelo and Puryear (1982) have all pointed to variance in black voting patterns in Britain and the United States. They show that black voters do *not* respond uniformly to their shared experiences as subjects of discrimination. Williams (1982:78–99), for example, notes that regional concentrations of black voters in the United States in 1980 produced great variance in (though only limited correlation with) the successful election to office of black candidates: southern states comprising more than 50 per cent of the nation's black population returned over 60 per cent of all black elected officials, whilst in the north-east the comparable figures were one in ten yielding one in twenty. However, what is equally important is the generally high level of similar voting patterns among minority racial groups. Using survey data from the late 1970s, Crewe (1983:272) reports that the British Labour Party held the support of 44 per cent of white voters compared with 95 per cent and 92 per cent of West Indian and Asian voters respectively.

Of course, racial differences are not only significant in terms of their impact on formal political participation, but are also closely intertwined with the distribution of power. Indeed, in several polities that have been characterized by overt legal discrimination on racial grounds, underlying power relations have served to exclude certain groups from key social and economic resources. In doing so, the skewed picture of control and influence below the level of formal participation served to reflect what was already apparent at the level of mass party politics. Moreover, as Wilson reminds us, the power relationship between racial groups is invariably uneven: 'Differential power is a marked feature of racial-group interaction in complex societies; the greater the power discrepancy between subordinate and dominant racial groups, the greater the extent and scope of racial domination' (Wilson 1973:18). But why should domination necessarily extend beyond the political realm? The response to this question must point to sociological and historical understanding of power as a multi-faceted concept which goes further than the use of coercive force in the face of interest confrontation. Economic and cultural dependency, for example, are both key forms through which domination has occurred 'and facilitated the emergence of still another, more sophisticated form of control: psychosocial dominance' (Baker 1983:80). This historical process was exemplified by the South African and Rhodesian cases, but it is important to note that, despite great emphasis placed on coercive and structural dominance, it has perhaps been the psychosocial that has had the most enduring consequences (Baker 1983:81). The counterforces of black African nationalism have been conspicuous by their diluted impact in both these societies compared with numerous other post-colonial African states. Moreover, as many writers have commented, white