

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Volume I

Edited by
Mary Hawkesworth
and
Maurice Kogan



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In marked contrast to the Swiss system, that used by the Baltic countries, notably in Estonia (Aun 1940), between the two World Wars allowed any ethnic group comprising at least 3,000 people to set up a nation-wide community with institutions of its own; institutions with the power to tax its members and to administer its own public and private schools. These nation-wide ethnic governments resembled local governments except in their not being territorially grounded and having extensive language rights, in particular that of selecting the language of instruction in the schools. That system—which had its forerunners in the Polish Jewish *kahal* and in the *millets* of the Ottoman empire (Laponce 1960) did not survive the war and has not been imitated.

Between the extremes of the Swiss and the Estonian models, Finland offers the case of partially and temporarily grounded languages. Wherever the Swedish minority accounts for at least 8 per cent of the population of a given commune (the basic unit of local government), the public services are offered in the two official languages, Swedish and Finnish; however, a bilingual district will normally become unilingual Finnish if the Swedish population is shown by the census to have declined below the required minimum. (In the Åland Islands, however, the Swiss system of territorial unilingualism protects the Swedish minority as a result of the international treaties that regulate the status of that territory.)

The Canadian Federal Government has by and large patterned its language policies on those of Finland rather than those of either Switzerland or Belgium, responding in so doing to the wishes of its English-speaking population but also out of fear that a unilingual French Quebec might be closer to secession than if it remained bilingual. One cannot deny that possibility but, interestingly, the increase in language security of the Quebecois population through the language legislation mentioned earlier (p. 598) was correlated with a lowering of separatist fervour. This appears to confirm that the Swiss strategy of reducing contact between competing languages by juxtaposing unilingual areas rather than merging the languages within the same territory has the desired effect of lowering tensions—at least when the language cleavage is not reinforced by other non-linguistic cleavages that would make the ethnic groups concerned incompatible on too many grounds.

CONCLUSION

The rooting of political into economic analysis, especially Marxian analysis, has frequently led analysts of contemporary societies to view ethnic conflicts, and language conflicts in particular, as outdated conflicts, of a type that would disappear as the state became more modern. In fact, the general lowering of class tensions in most industrial societies after the Second World War has led to reconsideration of this forecast. Like religion, language does not lend itself easily

to compromise, least of all when the conflict is over boundaries, whether internal or external. Languages and states are both territorial animals.

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GENDER AND POLITICS

JONI LOVENDUSKI

Although 'the woman question' has often figured as a political issue since the middle of the nineteenth century, the question of the political significance of gender only became an issue in the study of politics in the 1970s. It arose partly in response to the women's studies movement which first emerged as part of the Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) which began in the 1960s. Prior to that the study of women and politics was not regarded as important enough to warrant any special attention. Gender was not regarded as a category of political analysis and women's political behaviour went at best undescribed or at worst misrepresented. If discussed at all, women tended to be regarded as surrogates of men and also as their inferiors. Women were widely believed to be less politically interested, active and competent than men. Such contentions were often based on prejudice, a reflection not of scientific analysis or reasoned debate, but of sexism in a male-dominated profession.

During the 1970s these prevailing views were challenged (Borque and Grossholtz 1974; Goot and Reid 1975; Jaquette 1974; Lovenduski 1981) and a wide-ranging debate was generated which continued throughout the 1980s. One product of this debate was a large and increasingly sophisticated subfield of political studies devoted to the study of gender and politics. This subfield has been constructed mainly by feminist political scientists, political theorists and political philosophers, and seeks to change the nature of the discipline. It has evolved from an initial and modest concern with mapping women's political behaviour using traditional categories of analysis—the 'add women and stir' approach—to a challenging critique of the very basis of political science. From the outset the question of why political science had so long ignored over half the population was regarded as an important issue, and it was from this initial preoccupation that the feminist critique of mainstream political science grew. That critique forms the core of the study of gender and politics and provides a major part of the dynamic of feminist political science.

But other factors are also at work here. The WLM marked an upswing that was so pronounced, first in the political mobilization of women and later in their

political integration, that mainstream political scientists could not ignore it. Changes were apparent in voting behaviour, in political activism, in agenda construction, policy formulation and political organization. The point here is that the current study of gender and politics is informed both by feminist political consciousness and by women's political behaviour. This essay will describe the inputs of each of these two factors and will assess the effect of their interaction on the development of the discipline.

FEMINISM

By the end of the 1980s many Western societies had experienced more than two decades of what is sometimes referred to as the second wave of feminism. Moreover, the movement had spread and was also apparent in a variety of forms and guises in the state socialist systems of Eastern Europe and in the Third World. The WLM was thus not only a large-scale social movement, it was also a powerful political force affecting state institutions, political parties, economic organizations and attitudes. One result was that women became a political constituency recognized and courted by a range of previously complacent, gender-blind or sexist organizations.

But, as is true of men, women are not a uniform political category. There is a range of different groups of women with both common and separate interests. What is true is that although some of the differences between women parallel differences between men, as for example in class, race, religion, region or nation, other differences, notably those to do with reproduction and domestic life, are gender specific and affect most aspects of women's and men's lives in ways that are different, but politically significant. Feminism is in part a response to this, but as a political force it has not had a uniform effect on women's lives and has not been universally espoused by women.

To consider this further we must first define some terms. Feminism, to paraphrase Dahlerup (1986), is the ideology whose basic goal is to remove the discrimination against and the degradation of women and to break down the male dominance of society. Feminists are those who subscribe to this feminist ideology. The WLM is the new feminist movement which appeared in Europe and the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. Its avowed goal is the liberation of women from male oppression, a goal whose implications went well beyond mere equality. The movement was characterized by the lack of an organizational hierarchy, spontaneous activities and new kinds of political action such as consciousness-raising groups, peace camps, etc. In many countries the WLM originated in the New Left, but traditional women's organizations also generated feminist politics, particularly over such issues as equal opportunity policy, fertility control and welfare politics. In many

countries the movement received its impetus from events organized by international organizations spreading versions of the feminist message (Randall 1987:243–4). Amongst the most important capacities of the WLM was the ability to mobilize large numbers of previously politically inactive women. Although early recruits came from the student, peace and New Left movements, it soon became apparent that the WLM represented an idea whose time had come. It spread quickly and brought family and personal life to the political agenda. Traditional ideas of politics were challenged by the slogan ‘the personal is political’. Activities were addressed to other women rather than, in the traditional political formula, to the state.

Philosophically, feminism draws on the three great liberatory traditions of European thought: liberalism, socialism and the social theories constructed from political readings of major psychoanalytic texts. Added to the basic corpus has been the influential post-war theoretical work of the major European post-structuralists on language and power. On the face of it feminist theory includes three distinct and contested positions normally typed liberal feminism, socialist feminism and radical feminism. Liberal and socialist feminism have both emerged from and developed in tandem with liberal and socialist thought, which they have also influenced. For example, the absorption by socialist feminists of theories of language and power parallel a similar (and related) absorption by mainstream socialists. Liberal and socialist parties devoted considerable attention to the development of equal opportunity strategy during the 1980s. Radical feminism, however, is rather different. It makes use of elements of all three liberatory traditions, and was at first clearly linked with socialist feminism. A number of divisions soon emerged. Radical feminists sought to credit women’s lives and skills with central importance. In identifying women with nature they were wary of what they regarded as the somatophobia of Western traditions of reason and logic. The fundamental division has been over the issue of essentialism or difference in the meaning of gender, the feminist variant of the nature/nurture argument. Put simply, radical feminists hold that the differences between men and women are innate, whilst socialist and liberal feminists believe these differences to be socially constructed. Male power and the oppression of women are, say radical feminists, not caused by society, they are caused by men. The root innate difference is one of sexuality. Male sexuality is the site of male power. It is a compulsive sexuality innately associated with violence and aggression. The world as viewed by radical feminists is divided by gender on the basis of innate and immutable characteristics. At its most extreme the theory holds that men hate women, are frightened by them, and use sexual violence and the doctrines of heterosexism to keep women under their dominance. This is an interesting argument which is much oversimplified here but has found response from many women. Texts of radical feminist authors such as Andrea Dworkin

and Mary Daly were widely read throughout the world during the 1980s (for example Dworkin 1981 and Daly 1979).

Politically the significance of the feminist nature/nurture debate lies in its organizational and strategic consequences. Taken to its logical conclusions, radical feminism means the biological, social and political separation of women and men. As a result, political activity is activity directed not at the penetration and reform of existing powerful institutions, but at the construction of alternatives. The mainstream, often called the 'malestream', of politics is consciously avoided. Such strategies have important consequences for action over specific policy areas in the short term, and in the short and long term for the nature of women's political roles. Moreover the assumption that there is an innate female nature obscures differences between women.

The emergence of the WLM in the 1960s was held to be a response to a particular social and political conjuncture. Vicky Randall (1987:221-2) offers three related explanations here: predisposing factors, facilitating factors, and specific triggering events. Predisposing factors are the aspects of women's situation which predisposed them to recognize their oppression. These include (in the USA where the movement began) increased numbers of educated women in the population, the presence of more divorced and separated women, a tendency to smaller families, awareness and availability of new contraceptive technology, a growing experience of paid employment outside the home and a growing sense of relative deprivation. Much is made, in published personal accounts of becoming a feminist, of the role of consciousness raising. Women from a variety of social and geographical backgrounds have described their growing sense of recognition as others recounted familiar experiences of the realization of the possibility that 'things were not my fault'. Facilitating factors are the ideological and institutional developments facilitating a feminist revival. In some countries this meant the coming of age of the first full generation of women to have grown up with the complete array of citizen rights. In others it was the general introduction of civil and human rights, either for the first time or after a long period of oppression (for example, Spain, Greece and Portugal). The social movement politics of the baby boomers, as they came of age in the 1960s and organized in peace, anti-war and civil rights groups, were important in the USA and in the European and English-speaking democracies. Such activities supplied a significant group of talented women with important political skills which, as Jo Freeman (1975) recounts, were readily transferable from one social movement to another. Specific triggering events sometimes occurred within the politics of the new social movements. In the New Left a general stress on equality, liberatory goals and the unmasking of systematic oppression did not apparently extend to sex equality. The male-dominated left of the 1960s and 1970s, like its nineteenth-century predecessors, dismissed the case for women's liberation as at best irrelevant and at worst divisive.

The result was that angry women began to form their own groups to discuss their situation. These groups soon established journals, devised their own political activities and were an early manifestation of the WLM.

In organizational, ideological and political terms the WLM is a new social movement. Thus when feminism does, for whatever reasons, engage the institutions of state and government, its central problem is the lack of fit between a social movement and a hierarchical political organization. Feminism, although a diverse movement, has exhibited a preference for the simplicity of direct democracy. It has been uncomfortable with the forms and practices of representative democracy which it suspects of being hierarchical, elitist, draconian and generally undemocratic. A process of feminists coming to terms with this problem occurred only during the 1980s. This was not only because of a desire on the part of some feminists to have access to the power and authority that political office brings, but also because the feminist experience highlighted a number of major political issues in which women had a particular stake. Matters such as equal pay, equal rights, access to abortion, reproductive rights, protection from violence, the rights of sexuality, the maintenance of family forms, the availability of pornography, etc. were all issues over which the state exercised some control and which had for some time been matters of public policy. This was recognized by feminists, but initially self-help, direct action and campaigns were the preferred modes of influence. It gradually became apparent, however, that other forms of activity were more effective, and feminists faced the dilemmas posed by the risks of co-optation as against the dangers of powerlessness. The tensions thus posed are continuing ones, but two key trends of the 1980s were a manifestation of efforts to deal with the dilemma. These were the widespread phenomenon of feminists attempting to move into traditional organizations, and the accompanying phenomenon of those organizations adapting to feminist entry.

It is at this point that a distinction between the political roles of women and the political roles of feminists becomes important. Not all of the women who are politically active would regard themselves as feminists; indeed, many of those women engaged in the struggle for sex equality in their political party or trade union would explicitly deny that they are feminist (the 'I am not a feminist, but...' syndrome). It is not possible, on the evidence available, to argue that the general rise in women's political activism and the change in women's political behaviour in many countries that was apparent by the beginning of the 1980s was a direct result of the rise of feminism. But it is almost certainly the case that the phenomena are related and that the factors leading to the growth of the WLM also led to changes in women's political and social behaviour. It is likely, but not certain, that feminism as a phenomenon affected and influenced these developments. With this proviso in mind the political behaviour of women may be considered.

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF WOMEN

Investigations of women's political behaviour prior to the 1970s reflected the concerns of the discipline as it was then constructed. The major work was Duverger's *The Political Role of Women* (Duverger 1955), which was commissioned by UNESCO and compared the political participation of women in four West European countries. This was an important study which, despite some lacunae, remains of interest today. Other work was less systematic, and it was not until the 1970s that studies of women and politics began to be reviewed in the main academic journals and to appear on student reading lists. At first interest focused on rescuing women from the invisibility to which previous generations of political scientists had assigned them. Initially, scholars used the categories determined by a discipline designed to study men to identify and describe how and where women fitted in. According to these categories, women were less politically active and engaged, and it was also revealed that often no data describing the roles of women existed. Thus an early concern of feminist political scientists was to write women in, in order to map out their political behaviour (Randall 1982; Lovenduski and Hills 1981; Jaquette 1974). This endeavour continued, but before very long scholars began to believe that important questions were not being asked and were being obscured by the conventions of political science. Questions were raised about what women's political involvement was. A need to begin researching individuals at local and community level and to build outward to the national arenas was identified. It was recognized, particularly amongst Scandinavian researchers, that only by defining politics in its widest sense would it be possible to analyse and understand the politics of gender (Hernes 1984a; Siltanen and Stanworth 1984).

The perception that women are less politically active and interested than men has some empirical basis. Immediately after their enfranchisement women were less likely to vote than were men. Amongst those who did vote, women were more likely than men to vote for parties of the right. Many of the explanations offered for this tended to essentialism and were often rather sexist (Borque and Grossholtz 1974; Siltanen and Stanworth 1984). Serious analysis showed that explanation lay with economic, educational and religious differences between men and women. As these differences declined or changed in nature so did the behaviour with which they were associated. Thus, by the 1980s, in the USA and in some northern European countries women outvoted men, and in many places a bias to the right was replaced by a preference for the parties of the left (Mueller 1988; Norris 1987). Such phenomena are termed gender gaps and occur at the level of political attitudes, interest and behaviour and are of increasing concern to political parties and others concerned with political campaigning. The idea of a woman's vote has become important, but the phenomenon of the gender gap is not well studied.

Most of the research has been conducted in the USA and suggests that gender became increasingly politicized from the 1970s onwards. Gurin (1985) demonstrated the existence of shifts in gender group awareness amongst US women. Miller *et al.* (1988) devised a concept that they called gender consciousness, which taps the relationship between gender group awareness and support for policies that enhance group interest. They showed that over time gender consciousness tended to become more connected with political beliefs.

The timing of these changes suggests a relationship between the WLM and a general change in the political activism of women. This view is also supported by data about women's political representation. Council of Europe data on women's membership of European lower houses of parliament show that the first elections after the Second World War returned legislatures in which women's membership ranged from 1.5 per cent in Belgium to 7.8 per cent in Sweden. By the late 1980s the range was from 1.2 per cent in Cyprus to 34.4 per cent in Norway. The percentage increases in representation varied from a low 1.2 per cent in France to 29 per cent in Norway. The bulk of the larger increases, which were in the Nordic States and the Netherlands, took place between 1975 and 1985 (Sineau 1988). Other evidence indicates that these years were a time of rising levels of political interest, activism and organization for women (Lovenduski 1986; Haavio-Mannila *et al.* 1986).

Information about the political representation of women in formal political arenas has become more widely available, but less is known about informal activities. Hernes has written that 'women's traditional activities have been incorporated into the political system later than men's, less completely than men's, and under different political conditions from men's' (Hernes 1984b: 6). Moreover their organizational activity is less well recognized. National studies often overlook local organizations and women's memberships tend to be less likely to be counted. Nevertheless, the available data confirm that throughout Europe women are less often members of organizations than men.

But what of other participation? Marsh and Kaase (1979) have shown that young women are more predisposed to direct action than men of similar age. Women have played key roles in national liberation struggles and in the great political revolutions of modern times. Women are prominent in the resistance movements of Latin America. There is a robust and growing WLM in India (Randall 1987:242-3). Norwegian studies have indicated that women in Norway in general participate as often as men, but in different kinds of activity. There are also data which indicate that women who are in paid employment, full or part time, participate more frequently than full-time housewives (Hernes 1984b). This suggests that where women are economically integrated they are more likely to be politically integrated, a finding that has been replicated in a number of countries.

This list is only a taste of the available information, which is, although incomplete, now rather extensive. We know that women are less likely to be present in political elites than men, and that this is true at practically all levels of the political system. We also know that the law of increasing disproportions works for gender, that the higher we ascend a power hierarchy the fewer women we will find. It also appears that liberal democratic forms are a resource for feminists who have had great difficulty organizing in the state socialist countries and under many of the autocratic regimes of the Third World. There are paradoxes, however. The United States, with perhaps the strongest instance of second wave feminism, will feature a numerical advantage of women over men in the voting electorate for the foreseeable future, yet it has a relatively low legislative representation of women for a liberal democracy. We also know, however, that in some places, notably the Nordic states, women have captured increasing shares of positions of political power. It seems clear that the advanced welfare states with their liberal democratic forms and longstanding feminist traditions are, if not woman-friendly, then certainly more receptive to women than are other political systems.

DO WOMEN HAVE AN INTEREST?

An important question that this raises is the one of whether the politicization of gender—increasing representation of women—makes a difference. Often this question is addressed in terms of simple policy outputs and, on the basis of a proliferation of equal opportunity policies, it is concluded that a difference has been made. But policy which especially affects women need not be policy on ‘the woman question’. In a society in which there is a gendered division of labour there is almost no area of policy in which women and men are not differently affected. For example, in London women are the main users of public transport, making public transportation a gendered issue. Women have a greater interest than men in the design of buses and trains, in the frequency of their services in the hours that they run, in the security and safety provisions they offer.

Clearly, the question of whether women make a difference is a complicated one and must be addressed on several levels. This takes us back to the issue of what women do politically, but also raises questions about whether women constitute an interest. During the 1980s both empirical and theoretical research became more concerned with these questions, which are at the heart of debates about gender, power and political science.

Empirical approaches to the issue of women’s representation were constrained both by funding limitations which severely restrict work on political attitudes and grassroots participation, and by the obvious limits of having only a very small number of women who were members of political elites. The

exception was Scandinavia, where research programmes tended to be well funded and where a sizeable sample of women had experience of national political office. Not surprisingly, many of the important research developments of the 1980s were Scandinavian-led.

The Danish political scientist, Drude Dahlerup, studied the changes brought about when women became a sizeable minority in a national legislature (Dahlerup 1988). She tested the notion that only when the minority of women in legislatures reaches a certain size (critical mass) will the presence of women make a difference. She hypothesized that one would expect to find six different kinds of change: in reactions to women politicians; in the performance and efficiency of the women politicians; in the political culture; in the political discourse; in policy (political decisions); and in the empowerment of women. Using public opinion data and data collected in qualitative and quantitative studies of Nordic women politicians, she found that voters have become more receptive to women politicians, that turnover rates amongst women politicians have fallen, that new forms of politics have been consciously and successfully introduced and that issues about the position of women have become part of the political discourse. Change was apparent on each of her first four items. Before addressing her last two indicators, policy change and women's empowerment, she questioned the concept of the critical mass itself. The idea of the critical mass is borrowed from physics and refers to the point at which enough fissionable material is assembled to generate a chain reaction. Transferred to political representation, it refers to the number of representatives required for the rate of representation to accelerate. Dahlerup regards the analogy as a tortured one and suggests that the concept of a critical act would be more appropriate to political analysis. A critical act is one which will change the position of the minority considerably and will lead to further changes. Most significant will be 'the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilise the resources of the organization or institution to improve the situation for themselves and the whole minority group' (Dahlerup 1988:296). For parliamentary women these are critical acts of empowerment. In the Nordic states such critical acts have taken place. For example, women politicians began consciously to recruit other women during the 1980s, they have been instrumental in instituting party quotas for women and they have been involved in the initiation, design and implementation of equality legislation and institutions. In the Nordic case, increasing the number of women politicians made a difference.

Dahlerup's research coincided with work by other feminist political scientists which re-examined the concept of political interest in the light of insights about the relationships between gender and political power. Kathleen B. Jones and Anna G. Jonasdottir (1988) argue that the language of political theory and political science is so constructed that it excludes women, and they use the

concept of political interest to make their case. Their argument is an extension of earlier critiques of political science. It affirms that if gender is to be understood in the political science canon, then basic categories of analysis must be reformulated in terms of gender. This entails effort both to analyse the political meanings of gender and to deconstruct standard political concepts (Jones and Jonasdottir 1988: chapter 1).

This is easier said than done, and what Jones and Jonasdottir achieve is a demonstration of the limitations of previous efforts to construct a feminist political science. They criticize work by Sapiro (1981, 1983), Hernes (1984a) and others for implicit support of a patriarchal hierarchy of values. Sapiro is taken to task for implying that it is women who need changing rather than affirming that it is politics that must change if it is 'to accommodate the multiplicity and vitality of women's voices' (Jones and Jonasdottir 1988:24).

We cannot assess the gender and political interest debate unless we acknowledge that developing a gender-sensitive political science is work in progress. Contributions by Gilligan (1982), Nelson (1984), Hartsock (1982) and Harding (1986) underline the value of analysis that starts with women's experiences and perceptions. Sapiro's (1981) essay on the political interests of women was a major advance on what had gone before. Similarly, new work on gender and power will generate criticism which informs its progress. What will be central to the best of the analysis to come is a normative understanding that 'women should be able to act on the strength of being women and not mainly despite being women' (Jones and Jonasdottir 1988:53). What feminism brings to political science is the theoretical opportunities offered by a commitment to this standpoint. What political science offers to feminism is the affirmation of the importance of politics, the knowledge that to concede the political arena is to concede the crucial sites of power.

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DEVELOPMENT

RONALD H. CHILCOTE

Accounts of development do not generally incorporate a clear conception of the term itself, but instead dwell on theoretical perspectives or politics that change in response to evolving conditions within countries and between countries and the world order, whether they be characterized as advanced capitalist, command socialist, developing capitalist or socialist, or backward and underdeveloped cases. In his attention to mainstream thinking, Eckstein (1982) concluded that the past endeavour has been a 'muddle' and that we must apply more observation and lucid thought in understanding development. In his critique, David Booth affirmed that the Marxist-influenced sociology of development had reached an impasse and a general malaise in inquiry, the consequence of 'commitment to demonstrating the "necessity" of economic and social patterns, as distinct from explaining them and exploring how they may be changed' (Booth 1985:761).

Despite this pessimism, a conceptualization is possible. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* simplistically defines development as 'a gradual unfolding' and a 'gradual advance or growth through progressive changes'. Mittelman refers to development as 'the increasing capacity to make rational use of natural and human resources for social ends', whereas underdevelopment is 'the blockage which forestalls a rational transformation of the social structure' (Mittelman 1988:22). Baran reminds us that, historically, development means 'a far-reaching transformation of society's economic, social, and political structure, of the dominant organization of production, distribution, and consumption' and that it 'has never been a smooth, harmonious process unfolding placidly over time and space' (Baran 1957:3). Rodney correctly tells us that development is 'a many-sided process', implying for the individual 'increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being' (Rodney 1974:3). He goes on to show that 'a society develops economically as its members increase jointly their capacity for dealing with the environment' (*ibid.*: 4). He argues that people have

the capacity for improving their ability to live more satisfactorily through the exploitation of the resources of nature: ‘Everywhere, man was faced with the task of survival by meeting fundamental material needs; and better tools were a consequence of the interplay between human beings and nature as part of the struggle for survival’ (ibid.: 5). Chilton (1987) works towards a definition of political development by applying a Piagetian psychological theory of individual development to a symbolic conception of political culture in order to link individual and institutional change in the developmental process, and thereby identify developmental ‘sequences’ in the ways people relate to one another. Other efforts at defining political development are to be found in Binder (1986) and Palmer (1989), while Riggs (1981) suggests that the term cannot be conceptualized.

All these definitions suggest that development is a multi-faceted process, involving political, economic, social and cultural dimensions at the levels of individual and society as a whole. Whereas the political science approach to development during the 1950s and 1960s concentrated on the ‘political’ nature of development (see Almond 1970; Packenham 1964; Pye 1966), the literature increasingly recognized the relationship of political development to economic and other facets of development. Development came to be viewed as a process involving all of society so that academic attention to development evolved from single to multi-disciplinary perspectives. Eventually, with the emergence of capitalism and socialism as predominant economic systems, theories and policies of development turned toward one or the other of these alternatives. Graphically the evolution of the concept development can be delineated:

<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Process</i>
Political	Representative and participatory democracy
Economic	Central and decentralized planning
Social	Provision of human needs
Cultural	Fostering of selflessness, collaboration, solidarity, political consciousness and social responsibility

Thus, the central concern of the political thrust of development would be with democracy in its major forms, whereas the economic emphasis on development might be concerned with planning; the social aspect with people’s basic needs such as food and shelter, health care, education and employment; and the cultural level with the building of individual outreach to others.

Another way of portraying the characteristics of development is according to historical, geographical and ideological distinctions:

<i>First World</i>	<i>Second World</i>	<i>Third World</i>
Private capitalism	Command socialism	Human needs
Political + Economic	Economic + Social	Social + Economic

The First World of advanced capitalist societies reflects patterns of representative or formal democracy and private ownership of the means of production, usually in concert with state policy, including planning and action favouring capitalism (Sweezy 1942). The Second World of socialist societies has traditionally (until the upheavals in 1989) existed under command economies emphasizing central planning, and the provision of basic social needs, but with limited democratic space and little experimentation with representative and participatory forms of democracy (Post and Wright 1989). The Third World of less developed and underdeveloped countries has, in the case of revolutionary situations, directed the attention of the state to resolving basic human needs and implementing centralized planning, while experimenting with representative and participatory forms of democracy in the face of domination of outside capital and the pressures of the financial and corporate world. Cultural resistance and the defence of traditional values has often been a response of indigenous peoples to colonial rule. Cultural expression has also accompanied socialist and revolutionary experiences as a means for reshaping the commitment and solidarity of people. Political culture is usually associated with development as a means of characterizing the extent people participate in the civil society.

EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES

The field of development can be thought of as evolving through various historical phases since the Second World War. A first phase, predominant in the 1950s and 1960s, emphasized the idea that the Anglo-American experience in political democracy and capitalist accumulation could be diffused to the rest of the world (Rostow 1960). A second phase, conspicuous in the 1960s and 1970s, embraced views from the Third World that argued that the diffusion of capitalism and technology from the advanced industrial nations tended to promote underdevelopment and backwardness in the less developed regions of the world (Baran 1957). A third phase, evident during the 1980s, involved a reassessment of the impact of the earlier ideas on the mainstream of political science, together with a disenchantment in both capitalism and socialism, a call for a balance of resources to lessen inequality, and new policies to deal with environmental and other issues confronting the world at large (Brown *et al.* 1990). The changing theoretical and practical perspectives of development

reflected changing relations between developing and developed countries as well as changes in the theoretical discourse.

At least six schools of thought are evident in the literature on development over the past half-century. A first school, based on a traditional view that growth produces development, relies on liberal democracy and capitalism (Almond and Coleman 1960). It presumes that, once the foundation of capitalist growth is established, policy makers will be able to allocate resources to meet social needs and mitigate differences in income and other inequalities among individuals in society. A second school, opposed to the view that capitalism promotes the welfare of society, embraces the perspectives of dependency and underdevelopment, advocating resistance to external influences and the building of autonomous societies, premised either on capitalism or socialism (Frank 1966; Dos Santos 1970). A third school turns to the world system and to international political economy in its depiction of central, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries evolving through centuries of capitalist influence and dominance and cycles of economic prosperity and decline (Bollen 1983; Chase-Dunn 1977; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977; Wallerstein 1974). A fourth school emphasizes the mode of production as a means for assessing the relations people have to their work and the possibilities of transitions from pre-capitalist social formations to capitalism and socialism (Foster-Carter 1978). A fifth school identifies trends toward the internationalization of capital and labour (Palloix 1975), the rise of multinational corporations (Baran and Sweezy 1966), and the impact of late capitalism in the less developed parts of the world since the Second World War (Mandel 1975). The sixth school incorporates old and new understandings of imperialism in its view of the world (Brewer 1980).

Many theoretical tendencies run through these schools of development, and the task of delineating and sorting them out is complex and difficult. Pye (1966) set forth ten views related to economic development, industrialization, political modernization, the nation-state, administrative and legal organization, mass mobilization, democracy, orderly change, power and social change, but his review of these tendencies settled on democracy as the essential ingredient of development. In their overview of political development, Huntington and Domínguez (1975) identified two currents as converging in a focus on political development, one emanating with the expansion of area studies and American influence into Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America after the Second World War, and the other stemming from the behavioural movement in political science and its attention to empirical theory and research in the search for a systemic framework. They noted at least three directions in the literature: the system-function approach that focused on systems theory and structural functionalism in the work of Levy (1966), Almond and Powell (1966), and others; the social process approach that applied comparative quantitative analysis to the

study of urbanization, industrialization and the media in the work of Lerner (1958), Deutsch (1961), Tanter (1967) and others; and the comparative history approach of Black (1966); Eisenstadt (1966), Moore (1966), and Huntington (1968). Chodak (1973) emphasized five approaches: evolutionary theories, macro-sociological theories of industrialization, psychological explanations, political and economic development, and modernization. Chilcote (1981) surveyed beyond these approaches to suggest six general themes in the literature: political development, development and nationalism, modernization, underdevelopment, dependency, and imperialism. A few years later he emphasized the latter three themes in a historical synthesis of ideas on development in the Third World, and drew a dichotomy between, on the one hand, reformist, nationalist and capitalist views (for example, Furtado 1964; Cardoso and Faletto 1979, and revolutionary and socialist views on development and underdevelopment (for example, Baran 1957; Frank 1966; Amin 1974, on the other (Chilcote 1984). Blomström and Hettne (1984) and Hettne (1983) also moved beyond the theories on Western capitalist development to analyse dependency theory and approaches to underdevelopment in the Third World. Both Blomström and Hettne (1984) and Chilcote (1984) suggested that new directions in Marxism, particularly in the modes of production analysis (Foster-Carter 1978) and in internationalization of capital theory (Palloix 1975), had carried the discourse on development beyond these interpretations. Evans and Stephens (1988) chose four areas of interest to specialists on developmental problems: the state in the process of development; the distribution of resources generated by development; the relation between industrialization and political democracy; and national development and world political economy. Finally, Park (1984) and Dube (1988) offered a reappraisal of development and modernization by focusing on their weaknesses and strengths and addressing issues of the quality of life and human needs. (Other overviews are presented in Bernstein 1973; DeKadt and Williams 1974; Foster-Carter 1985; Goulet 1968; Griffin and Gurley 1985; Griffin and James 1981; Kay 1975, 1989; Oxaal *et al.* 1975; Roxborough 1979; Weiner and Huntington 1987.)

Given these diverse interpretations and overviews of the development literature, the reader can be guided to an understanding of different approaches through the rough classification of perspectives below. One perspective emphasizes patterns of capitalist accumulation and growth in economic development and sees formal or representative democracy as politically compatible with economic progress; it is generally reflective of developmental progress in Western advanced industrial nations and its classical theoretical inspiration likely derives from Adam Smith. The other perspective emphasizes human needs, planned economies, and participatory or informal democracy alongside representative democratic practices; it is generally reflective of developmental advances in the state bureaucratic regimes professing socialism as well as in nations that have

experienced revolution and advocated transitions to socialism and equality where classical theoretical inspiration tends to stem from Marx.

DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST NATIONS

A synthesis of the literature on the historical development of the advanced capitalist nations reveals many prominent approaches:

Classical growth model

W.Arthur Lewis (1955), a well-known proponent of this model, applied the classical view (that development is based on per capita growth and not distribution) to the possibility of sustainable growth in static and retarded economies of the Third World (particularly in the Caribbean and Africa). Although its influence has persisted, the model was largely discredited by the failure of much of the Third World to achieve significant growth.

Stages of growth

The notion of developmental stages is old, but its thrust has been especially influential in the work of Rostow (1960), who projected a five-stage model based on economic conditions: traditional, based on lack of technology and intensive labour in agriculture; preconditions for take-off based on technological advances; take-off or self-sustaining economic growth; the drive to maturity; and mass consumption oriented to consumer goods and services. Organski's (1965) four-stage political scheme followed a similar pattern: primitive unification; industrialization; national welfare; and politics of abundance. However, stage theory is limited by its failure to account for historical conditions, particularly the relationship of underdeveloped countries with now developed countries. Frank (1971), for example, attacked the theory for assuming that underdevelopment is an original stage of traditional society rather than the consequence of European capitalist expansion.

Poles of development

The French economist, François Perroux, advocated that the activities of a new enterprise could be integrated with the economy of a region or country where a development pole could link the processing of raw materials with labour supply and productivity and be oriented to domestic producers and consumers. This approach could overcome the inequity between centres and peripheries and mitigate the negative impact of dependent relationships through central planning. Rational diffusion of capital and technology would allow for

development of autonomous outlying centres which, in turn, could be integrated into a national scheme of development, ensure national control, and provide a balance between international and domestic investment. However, the idea had limited success in the Third World, where domestic capital was often overwhelmed by stronger international investors and where domestic capital itself was concentrated in only a few centres, often the capital city.

Modernization

Usually associated with capitalist development, Eisenstadt (1966) understood modernization as highly differentiated political structure and diffusion of political power and authority into all spheres of society. In his early work Apter (1965) considered modernization as a particular form of development, involving a stable social system, differentiated social structures, and social skills and knowledge adaptable to a technologically advanced world. Later he described this form of modernization as the attempt of traditional societies to replicate the institutions and values of advanced industrial societies. Parallel to this was another form of modernization that takes conflict and inequality rather than integration into account (Apter 1987). These approaches, however, tend to be general, related to stages of growth from traditional to modern forms, applicable to historical development in advanced industrial societies, and for much of the Third World reliant on ideal types rather than accurate descriptions of reality. Although the early theory was largely discredited, some observers (So 1990) believed that it had transcended its crisis of the late 1960s and assumed a fruitful line of inquiry two decades later.

Developmental nationalism or autonomous national development

Nationalism, essentially a late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European idea, evolved with the rise of nation-states such as Germany and Italy and is referred to in the developmental literature as an ideological force that draws people together in common cause (Senghass 1985). Its cohesion may be based on identification of a single territory, a common language, symbols of nationhood and national heroes, but many types of nationalism appear according to various experiences. Radical nationalism, for example, is associated with the national liberation movements that fought for independence in the emerging national states of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Scalapino 1989). In the mainstream literature Deutsch (1953) linked the idea of nationalism to development, while in radical perspective Horace Davis (1967) showed the relevance of nationalism and the national question to Marxism and socialist societies. Thus, national consciousness can be oriented to the nature of society, realizing the goals of the nation-state, and ensuring broad involvement in shaping future direction. While the forces of nationalism may serve the cause of

development, a theory of nationalism and development is not clearly discernible. Further, the pervasive impact of the international capitalist system in particular has tended to diminish the importance of the nationalist alternative.

Political democracy and order

The relationship of representative democracy to political development is a conspicuous theme in Pye (1966) and runs through the work of Almond (1970), Lipset (1959), Rustow (1970), Bollen (1979) and others. Political democracy becomes an ideal of consensus and bargaining in a give-and-take process. Apter (1971) emphasized that people make rational choices that relate to development and order and argued, like Hobbes, that development and order are interrelated, and that disorder may make development difficult to attain. Bates argued that 'while economic elites are behaving in ways that are economically irrational, they are behaving in ways that are politically rational' (Bates 1988:244). They may make rational choices in seeking solutions to political problems, but sometimes at economic costs that retard development. Huntington (1965) elaborated on stability in the face of rapid social and economic changes, and advocated control and regulation of development through constraints on new groups entering politics, limits to exposure to mass media, and suppression of mass mobilization. These approaches lean toward institutional continuity and harmony rather than deep-rooted change.

Crises of development

Binder *et al.* (1971) suggested that development is the capacity of a political system to make decisions and implement policies to meet new demands and goals such as equality of opportunity, social justice and involvement while sustaining continuous change. They focused on a 'developmental syndrome' in which crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration and distribution occur as the polity develops. This perspective tends to stress American political values and to skirt around a theory of structural change.

Post-liberal development

Bowles and Gintis (1986) sought space for a radical democratic synthesis and posited a post-liberal democracy on the expansion of personal rights through the affirmation of traditional political forms of representative democracy and individual liberty while ensuring the establishment of innovative and democratically accountable economic freedoms in community and work. Capitalism and democracy, they argued, are incompatible, and the welfare state does not give citizens the power to make democratic decisions in the economic sphere, and democratic theory is in disarray. Their synthesis rejected many ideas of

Marxism, in particular a view of class consciousness and direct democracy (ignoring Marx's advocacy of representative democracy in certain instances or his association of democracy with direct participatory activities). Their argument that Marxism reduces institutions to class terms leads to an emphasis on conflictual pluralism while obscuring class interests, diminishing the role of the state, and playing down the internal contradictions of capitalism which affect relations of production and often lead to class struggle. In capitalist society, development is also associated with decentralization of authority, routinization of bureaucratic tasks, competition among various interests for resources and power, consensus and bargaining, yet negative consequences appear with authoritarian regimes or the consolidating oligopolistic and monopolistic tendencies in the economy. In socialist society, rational planning and efficient management are expected to ensure economic growth and a more egalitarian distribution of resources to the people, but these goals are often undermined by mismanagement and lack of resources as well as failure to involve people in decisions affecting their production, basic needs, and material standards of living.

DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES IN SOCIALIST AND THIRD WORLD NATIONS

Capitalist development of underdevelopment

The argument that capitalism fosters underdevelopment as capital and technology diffuse from the advanced capitalist to the backward nations runs through an important literature emanating particularly from Paul Baran. Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth* (Baran 1957) was influential and popular among Third World scholars and students, particularly in Latin America. Baran identified forms of economic surplus (actual, potential and planned) in an explanation of the 'roots' and 'morphology' of backwardness. He despaired that 'the colonial and dependent countries today have no recourse to such sources of primary accumulation of capital as were available to the now advanced capitalist countries' and that 'development in the age of monopoly capitalism and imperialism faces obstacles that have little in common with those encountered two or three hundred years ago' (ibid.: 16).

Among the major regional studies that analysed this theme were André Gunder Frank's *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (Frank 1967), Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Rodney 1974), Malcolm Caldwell's *The Wealth of Some Nations* (Caldwell 1977), and Manning Marable's *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Marable 1983). Frank believed that national capitalism and the national bourgeoisie, unlike their counterparts in England and the United States, could not promote development in Latin

America. He argued that the contradictions of capitalism had led to the expropriation of economic surplus which generated development in the metropolitan centres and underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites. Cumings (1984) has delved into this problem and elaborated on its significance for the Asian political economy. Criticism of these views relates to emphasis on commercial patterns of international trade rather than to processes and relations of production. (See also Aleshina *et al.* 1983; Bagchi 1982; Beckford 1972; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Brenner 1976; Clarkson 1972; Frank 1966; Kay 1975, 1989; Laclau 1971; Roxborough 1979; Szentes 1971).

New dependency

Three forms of dependency appear in history: colonial dependency, evident in trade monopolies over land, mines and labour; financial-industrial dependency, accompanied by imperialism and the expansion of big capital at the end of the nineteenth century; and the new dependency, characterized by the capital of multinational corporations in industry oriented to the internal markets of underdeveloped nations after the Second World War. Dos Santos (1970) described this new form as conditioned by the relationship of dominant to dependent countries so that the expansion of the dominant country could have a positive or negative impact on the development of the dependent one. Dussel (1990) and Mohri (1979) criticized the dependency theorists for failure to root their conceptualization in the method of Marx (for other criticisms, see Brewer 1980; Caporaso 1980; Cardoso 1977; Chilcote 1974; Frank 1974; Henfrey 1981; Johnson 1981; Lehman 1979; Munck 1981).

Internal colonialism

A relationship similar to the colonial ties between nations, internal colonialism involved dominant and marginal groups within a single society. For example, according to the political sociologist González Casanova (1961), internal colonialism was represented by the monopoly of the ruling metropolis in Mexico City over the marginal Indian communities. The underdevelopment of the marginal society is the consequence of its exploitation by and dependence on the developing metropolis. (See Kahl 1976 for a critique.)

Inward directed development (desarrollismo)

Advocated by the Argentine economist, Raúl Prebisch, and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), *desarrollismo* implied autonomous or domestic capitalist development through the imposition of tariff barriers, the building of an infrastructure for the local economy, and import substitution to stimulate production. Although this view reveals differences between capitalism

in the advanced industrial centre and capitalism in the backward periphery, its reformist solutions to underdevelopment are usually insufficient to overcome the dominance of international capital.

Associated dependent capitalist development

Associated dependent capitalist development is defined as a situation in the periphery in which the domestic bourgeoisie ties itself to capitalism, associates with international capital, and through mediation of the state stimulates capitalist accumulation. According to Cardoso (1973) and Evans (1979), who used Brazil as an example, the accumulation and expansion of local capital thus depend on the dynamic of international capital. Socialist critics argue that this view promotes capitalist exploitation.

Unequal development

As set forth by Amin (1974), this line of thinking sees the world as comprising developed and underdeveloped societies, some of which are capitalist and others socialist, all integrated into a commercial and financial capitalist network on a world scale. Amin (1976) analysed unequal development in terms of disarticulation of different sectors of an economy, domination from the outside, and dependence caused by large foreign industrial business.

Unequal exchange

Elaborated by Emmanuel (1972) and based on David Ricardo's thesis on comparative costs and natural advantages of countries participating in commercial exchange, the theory of unequal exchange portrays capitalist production relations as penetrating a world economy whose units are distinguished by differences in specialization in the international division of labour and by unequal wage levels. (See also Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1978.)

Combined and uneven development

Drawn from the thinking of Trotsky, this theory argues that the most backward and the most modern forms of economic activity and exploitation are found in variable forms in different countries, but they may be linked or combined in their development, especially under the impact of imperialism. A combined and uneven social formation is evident, for example, in the period of transition from a pre-capitalist to a full capitalist economy so that elements of feudalism and capitalism might co-exist (see Lowy 1981; Mandel 1970; Novack 1966). Lenin (1956) demonstrated how Russia in the late nineteenth century evidenced this formation.

Late capitalism

Ernest Mandel (1975) provided an overview of capitalism since the Second World War, attempting to apply the laws of the capitalist mode of production to the post-war period of boom and decline. Late capitalism is a consequence of the integrated international system which necessitates the transfer of surplus from underdeveloped regions to industrialized regions, thereby delaying the development of the former. Some less developed countries have tried to minimize this tendency by nationalizing international capital (for example, Mexican petroleum in 1938 and Chilean copper during the early 1970s).

Mode of production

Development is largely determined by the level of the forces of production—the capital and technology, labour skill and efficiency attained by society. Capital accumulation and reproduction are essential for the maintenance and expansion of capitalism (Rey 1973). Crucial in promoting the forces of production, especially in the Third World, is whether capitalism itself must be strengthened *en route* to socialism or the capitalist stage skipped altogether. Amin (1976) identified pre-capitalist modes, including the communal mode, the tribute-paying mode, the feudal mode, and the slave-owning mode of production. This approach is sometimes deterministic in its reliance upon successive stages of development or limited by its reliance on predetermined modes that may not appear in some societies at particular historical periods (see Chilcote and Johnson 1983; Foster-Carter 1978; Taylor 1979).

Human needs development

Development can be understood in terms of meeting the basic needs of all people, a proposition emphasized by Dube (1988) and Kruijer (1987). Park (1984) identifies a fourfold structure of human needs: survival, belongingness, leisure and control. While it is problematic whether capitalist societies can meet such needs as health, food, shelter and employment, the politically representative character of many of them is usually viewed as a step towards development. Yet in capitalist societies large numbers of people often absent themselves from the electoral process, political participation is minimal, and grassroots political involvement may be dwarfed by electoral campaigns influenced by monied interests. Although socialist societies have generally been able to deal with basic human needs through the socialization of most means of production and planned distribution of resources, they have usually failed to establish either effective representative or participatory democracies. Thus, the welfare of all classes, groups and individuals is essential in societal development.

New imperialism and post-imperialism

Theories of imperialism were posited by J.A.Hobson (who utilized an under-consumption theory), Rudolf Hilferding (finance capital), and N.Bukharin and Lenin (monopoly capital). Contemporary analyses by Baran and Sweezy (1966), Brewer (1980), Fieldhouse (1967) and Girvan (1976), emphasized the advanced character of capitalism, especially in its monopoly form and its impact on colonial and less developed areas, while Palma (1978) carefully examined Lenin's thought for the roots of a theory of underdevelopment. These writers showed the negative consequences of the imperialist advance, yet some on the left, for example Warren (1980), have attempted to demonstrate that imperialism tends to destroy pre-capitalist social formations and provides for capitalist development everywhere.

In an effort to move beyond imperialist and dependency explanations of capitalist underdevelopment or associated capitalist development, Becker *et al.* (1987) argued that global institutions tend to promote the integration of diverse national interests on a new international basis by offering access to capital resources and technologies. This necessitates the location of both foreign labour and management in the dependent country as well as local participation in the ownership of the corporation. In such a situation two segments of a new social class appear: privileged nationals, or a managerial bourgeoisie, and the foreign nationals who manage the businesses of transnational organizations. This coalescing of dominant class elements across national boundaries suggests the rise of an international oligarchy. According to Becker *et al.*, a theory of post-imperialism serves as an alternative to a determinist Leninist understanding of imperialism and to dependency orthodoxy. However, international capital has dominated Third World situations, and there is little evidence to affirm that a managerial national bourgeoisie will emerge as hegemonic and other classes will decline, nor that the national bourgeoisie will favour democracy over authoritarianism.

Sub-imperialism

Dependent capitalism, according to Marini (1978), is unable to reproduce itself through the process of accumulation. However, in some dependent countries where an authoritarian military leadership takes charge, the economy can be reorganized and the working class and opposition oppressed to allow for a project of sub-imperialism. In this case the regime facilitates foreign investment and technology and increases domestic industrial capacity, but must also seek new markets, necessitating expansion into neighbouring countries. The dependent country thus becomes an intermediary between imperialist countries and other less developed countries which are vulnerable to exploitation. Criticism of this perspective focuses on its economic determinism and its

implication that only a revolutionary and not a reformist course would be necessary to overcome the ensuing exploitation.

Internationalization of capital

This theory permits an analysis of the movement of capital and class struggle on an international level, particularly the foreign investments and capital accumulation by capitalist enterprises of the centre that operate in the developing countries, and the rapid growth in the internationalization of other forms of capital such as private and public export credits, bank loans and commodity exports. This theory was elaborated by Hymer (1972) and Palloix (1975), and applied to a case study in West Africa by Marcussen and Torp (1982).

Strategies and issues

A central issue for much of the world, according to Mittelman (1988), is how to attain an investable surplus while reducing global inequality in the face of international organizations, aid agencies, technological agreements, multinational corporations and banks. He argues that underdevelopment is not inevitable in the Third World, but is the consequence of three forces: capital accumulation, the state, and social classes. He delves into three general strategies of how nations could join global capitalism, retreat from the world capitalist system, and balance the bonds of dependency.

Kruijer (1987) focuses directly on the poor and the oppressed by analysing their plight in terms of the national and international wealth system of domination. He suggests a 'liberation' strategy to provide for basic needs such as education and health care, shelter and clothing, to ensure balanced development of the forces of production, orient social values in a socialist direction; emancipate women, abolish class distinctions, establish political power with the people, and end economic relationships with the wealthy powerful capitalist world. He sees the process of change as evolving through phases: from the capitalist mode of production in which the bourgeoisie is the ruling class and dominates the state; to a transitional phase in which the capitalist mode is gradually abolished and the interests of the people are represented by the state but the people have little say; to a state-socialist phase in which private enterprise has largely disappeared and the people still have little input; to a democratic socialist phase in which the power of the state is gradually reduced and decisions are increasingly vested in the people.

Dube (1988) sums up a number of policy recommendations in the direction of rethinking the goals and strategies of development: plans for economic growth must be balanced by enriching the quality of life and meeting the basic needs of all people; eliminate all poverty, not by welfarism but by a radical